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Abstract 
This thesis examined cost growth in Department of Defense (DoD) aircraft 
weapon systems from 1991 to 2001 using Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data with a 
hybrid adjusted cost growth (ACG) model.  In addition, an analysis of acquisition reform 
initiatives during the treatment period was conducted to determine if reform efforts 
impacted aircraft weapon system cost growth.  A “pre-reform” (1 January 1991 to 31 
December 1996) period and “post reform” (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001) period 
was subjectively developed to compare the mean annual ACG during each period for 
statistical differences.  The hybrid ACG model outlined in this thesis may aid program 
managers and other interested parties in determining weapon systems cost growth, and 
the conclusion drawn from analyzing current acquisition initiatives may assist DoD 
leadership in assessing reform effectiveness on reducing cost growth.   
This research effort analyzed 78 SARs for 13 aircraft weapon systems that 
reported a Milestone II baseline during the treatment period.  ACG calculations revealed 
that aircraft systems from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001 averaged 40 percent cost 
growth annually.  The acquisition reform analysis included 43 SARs from 11 programs 
during the pre-reform period and 35 SARs from 7 programs in the post-reform period.  A 
small sample t-test was used to compare the annual means of the two periods and 
revealed that at a .05 significance level no significant difference existed between the 
annual average ACG for the pre-reform and post reform periods.  The thesis 
methodology, results, and suggestions for future research are provided. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEMS COST GROWTH AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES USING A 
HYBRID ADJUSTED COST GROWTH MODEL 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
Cost growth in major weapon system programs, defined as the difference between 
estimated and actual costs, has been an enduring problem in the Department of Defense 
(DoD) for the past four decades.  According to a 1993 RAND study, cost growth has 
hovered around 20 percent since the mid 1960s.  Table 1 identifies the average cost 
growth factors between services as of 31 December 1990 and Table 2 provides the 
average cost growth factors by system type as of 31 December 1990.  
Table 1.  Cost Growth Differences Between Services (Drezner, 1993:26) 
Service   
Cost 
Growth 
Factor 
Number of 
Observations 
Average Program 
Cost (billions 
FY90$) 
Average Age (years 
past EMD) 
Total DE 1.20 120 5.50 9.40 
     
Air Force 1.20 41 6.70 8.70 
Army 1.35 28 2.70 10.30 
Navy 1.16 51 6.10 9.50 
     NOTE:  DE baseline, weighted average, mature programs. 
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Table 2.  Cost Growth by System Type (Drezner, 1993:28) 
Weapon 
Type   
Cost 
Growth 
Factor 
Number of 
Observations 
Average Program 
Cost (billions 
FY90$) 
Average Age (years 
past EMD) 
Aircraft 1.28 14 13.8 10.50 
Helicopter 1.13 5 8.10 13.00 
Missile 1.17 44 5.10 9.50 
Electronic 1.24 27 2.20 8.50 
Munition 1.22 7 1.70 7.70 
Vehicle 1.71 3 3.00 12.00 
Space 1.16 3 2.00 12.00 
Ship 1.10 14 7.50 9.10 
Other 0.99 3 3.00 5.70 
     NOTE:  DE baseline, weighted average, mature programs. 
  
 
Risk and uncertainty, an inherent driver in weapon systems development cost 
growth, pose a significant challenge to the cost estimator.  In an attempt to minimize risk 
and uncertainty, streamline the procurement process, and decrease cost growth, the DoD 
has implemented numerous acquisition reform initiatives over the past 40 years.  Most 
recently, the October 30, 2002 memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz 
canceled the DoD 5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents stating “I have 
determined that the current subject documents require revision to create an acquisition 
policy environment that fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation” 
(Wolfowitz, 2002).  Cancellation of the DoD 5000 series marks the latest attempt by the 
DoD to minimize weapon system cost growth and minimize negative public opinion 
about procurement cost overruns. 
Specific Issue  
Historically, cost estimation has posed a tremendous challenge to estimators and 
program managers in defense weapon systems procurement.  Unrealistic or imprecise 
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weapon system cost estimates negatively impact the quality of decisions concerning U.S. 
defense policy; distorting the rational for resource allocation decisions.  An occasional 
unrealistic estimate would not pose a significant problem.  However, even despite 
acquisition reform initiatives implemented in the 1970s and 1980s to reduce costs, 
research has shown that weapon system programs during this period continued to 
experience cost and schedule overruns regularly (Searle, 1997:38).  In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, additional reform initiatives were enacted by the Clinton and Bush 
administrations to curb this trend.  Figure 1 displays the timeline of current acquisition 
reform initiatives.  While the last three DoD acquisition chiefs have deemed the current 
acquisition reform movement successful (Holbrook, 2003:2-3), a weapon system cost 
growth statistical analysis is needed to obtain an objective measure of the successfulness 
during this period.  
 
Figure 1.  Current Acquisition Reform Initiatives (1991 to 2003) 
Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study focuses on measuring total aircraft weapon systems cost growth from 
DoD Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) by applying a hybrid adjusted cost growth 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
NPR FASA Clinger-Cohen DoDD 5000 Rewrites 
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model, along with analyzing the impact of recent acquisition reform initiatives on cost 
growth over time.  While past research has analyzed combined program cost growth over 
all weapon systems, this study attempts to identify cost growth from a more micro level 
of analysis.  The SAR is one of the few official management reporting systems that 
provides consistent and reasonably reliable data on the status of DoD acquisition 
programs (Drezner, 1993:7).  These reports are developed annually at the program office 
level and are reviewed by the Performance Management Office in OUSD(A) before they 
are released in conjunction with the President’s budget.  SARs summarize the latest 
estimates of cost, schedule and technical status, while separating program cost variance 
into seven categories: Economic, Quantity, Estimating, Engineering, Schedule, Support, 
and Other (Drezner, 1993:7). 
     For the purpose of this research, the SAR provides an easily accessible, universally 
utilized database that offers sufficient data reliability; however, it is not without 
limitations.  According to the 1993 RAND report, the SAR may introduce unacceptable 
error in the cost growth calculation unless care is taken to fully understand how the data 
was generated (Drezner, 1993:9).  RAND identified the following problem areas with the 
SAR: 
 1.  High level of aggregation 
 2.  Changing baseline estimate and program restructuring 
 3.  Changing preparation guidelines and thresholds 
 4.  Inconsistent allocation of cost variances 
 5.  Emphasis on effects, not causes 
 6.  Incomplete coverage of program causes 
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 7.  Unknown and varied budget levels for program risk 
     Additionally, security classifications of sensitive programs may render some cost data 
unavailable for this research.  Chapter III will address the precautions taken to minimize 
the effects of these problem areas on cost growth calculations. 
Research Objectives 
This research has two main objectives.  First, the study quantifies the magnitude 
of aircraft weapon systems cost growth from 1991 to 2001 using a hybrid adjusted cost 
growth methodology.  Capturing the current cost growth trend will identify if acquisition 
programs have improved cost overruns or if they continue to accumulate cost growth.  
The results of this research will provide insight into the budgetary status of aircraft 
weapon systems and offer DoD officials a cost growth model that can be used to 
determine how well program management has done in estimating and controlling costs 
within its command. 
     Second, the study determines the impact of acquisition reform initiatives on aircraft 
weapon systems cost growth from 1991 to 2001.  It is important to determine if continued 
acquisition reform efforts are actually accomplishing their objectives, since previous 
research has found no conclusive evidence that acquisition reform has reduced cost 
growth.  This statement is further reinforced in the 1993 RAND study which states, “It 
seems reasonable to expect that the myriad of initiatives implemented over the last 
several decades intended to control costs and improve cost estimating capabilities would 
have had some positive effect.  Unfortunately, we can detect no such effect in the data” 
(Drezner 1993:50).  If a reduction in cost growth is found, DoD leadership may use this 
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analysis to build a model for estimating the amount of time required before reform 
initiatives impact cost growth.  However, if current reform initiatives fail to prove 
positive impact on cost growth, then the acquisition community and legislators may need 
to rethink the current situation and address the problem of cost growth from another 
angle. 
Summary 
This study quantifies the magnitude of aircraft weapon system cost growth by 
developing and applying a RAND hybrid adjusted cost growth model.  Expanding on the 
cost growth determination, this research explores the impact of recent acquisition reform 
initiatives on current cost growth trends.  Identification of current cost growth levels and 
the impact of acquisition reform efforts will provide program managers and government 
officials with insight into the effectiveness of the acquisition process and recent 
legislation on reducing weapon system cost growth.  
Organization of the Study 
This chapter established the motivation for analyzing the topic and the research 
objectives.  Chapter II describes past and present acquisition reform efforts and highlights 
recent cost growth studies.  Chapter III details the methodology used to analyze the 
quantitative cost data and Chapter IV identifies the results of the analysis.  Finally, 
Chapter V provides conclusions from the study and recommendations for further 
research. 
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II.  Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a description of aircraft weapon systems, examines both 
historical and current acquisition reform initiatives, and reviews recent cost growth 
studies.  
Aircraft Weapon Systems 
Aircraft Weapon Systems encompasses all aircraft programs whose primary 
motivation is airframe production as reported in the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR). 
The system capabilities comprise bomber, attack, fighter, cargo, tanker, and trainer 
planes.  Table 3 identifies the 13 specific aircraft systems reviewed in this study and 
provides each program’s technical nomenclature along with any common name in 
parentheses. 
Table 3  Aircraft Weapon Systems 
B-1B (Lancer) F-16 (Fighting Falcon) 
C130-J (Hercules) F-22 (Raptor) 
C-17 (Globemaster III) FA-18 E/F (Super Hornet) 
KC-135R (Stratotanker) FA-18 (Hornet) 
AV-B(Harrier) T-6A (JPATS) 
AV-B (Harrier Remanufacture) T-45-TS (Goshawk) 
F-14D (Tomcat)  
 
Aircraft weapon systems procurement and research test and evaluation (RDT&E) 
estimates combined total more than $25.50 billion of the 2004 Department of Defense 
(DoD) budget (Department of Defense, Program Weapon System Cost By Weapon 
System).  This is 39 percent of the total $136 billion weapon system procurement and 
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RDT&E budget, and identifying cost growth in these programs during the 11 year period 
from 1991 to 2001 would be of great interest to DoD leadership. 
Acquisition Reform 
The historical overview starts with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert 
McNamara’s changes in 1960 and concludes with the 1989 Defense Management Report.  
The current reform overview begins with the National Performance Review (NPR) and 
ends with a summary of recent DoD 5000 series rewrites.  During the period in review, 
acquisition reform has evolved with each administration’s reports and recommendations. 
The most recent acquisition reform framework is as follows: 
Acquisition reform, a theory pervasive throughout the Department of Defense, is 
an endeavor to make the acquisition process more effective, efficient, and 
productive. It involves reducing overhead, streamlining requirements, speeding up 
processes, cutting paperwork and other similar initiatives to reduce bureaucracy. 
Acquisition reform includes a move toward the use of commercial practices as 
well as the use of private enterprise to do more of the functions traditionally done 
by government. (What is Acquisition Reform, DSMC, 2001) 
Historical Acquisition Reform Overview (1960s to 1990) 
Studies during the past 40 years by the DoD about acquisition reform have 
outlined ways to simplify and improve the weapon system procurement processes to 
make them more efficient and effective.  Table 4 lists some of the defense acquisition 
reports and studies conducted from the 1960s through the 1980s.  This historical reform 
summary will focus on those highlighted, as these are the ones recognized in most 
acquisition reform studies as the most meaningful and significant efforts to shape the 
acquisition process (Fox & Field, 1988:41; Jones, 1999:404). 
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Table 4.  Significant Defense Acquisition Studies (Jones, 1996:405) 
Report by Initiated by Issued
*McNamara Initiatives SECDEF 1961
Peck & Scherer (Harvard Business School) Authors 1962, 1964
*Packard Initiatives Deputy SECDEF 1969-1970
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission) President 1970
Commission on Government Procurement Congress 1972
J. Ronald Fox (Harvard Business School) Author 1974
Military Services and Secretary of Defense DoD 1974-75
Defense Science Board Summer Study DoD 1977
     (Acquisition Cycle Task Force)
Defense Resources Board DoD 1979
DoD Resource Management Study President 1979
Jacques S. Gansler Author 1980
Acquisition Improvement Task Force DoD 1981
     (Carlucci Initiatives)
Special Panel on Defense Procurement Procedures House Armed Services Committee 1982
Grace Commission President 1983
Special Task Force on Selected Defense Senate Armed Services Committee 1984
     Procurement Matters
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies Center 1985
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management President 1986
     (Packard Commission)
Defense Management Review DoD 1989
*Added by the authors
 
McNamara Initiatives 
Modern acquisition reform efforts began in the 1960s in an attempt to fix the 
procurement system when “Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert S. McNamara (1961 
to 68) instituted many of the first substantial acquisition reforms through his centralized 
decision-making apparatus and the new Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System” 
(Jones, 1999:402).  The system was a systematic process for establishing requirements 
and incorporating them into a five year budget.  In addition, McNamara formed the 
Defense Supply Agency (DSA), Defense Contract Administration Service (DCAS), and 
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA); all designed to improve the government 
acquisition process.  McNamara also initiated industry practices previously used at Ford 
Motor Company during in his days as an executive, there by “establishing requirements 
for analytical rigor in evaluating the need, costs, and operational effectiveness of new 
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weapons systems” (Reeves, 1996:16).  His blueprint for evaluating weapon system 
programs through concept exploration, research and development, and production phases 
laid the framework for the life cycle process used by the DoD and defense contractors 
today.  Despite these significant attempts to improve the weapon systems procurement 
process, DoD “continued to reward cost increases and to penalize cost reductions” (Fox 
and Field, 1988:42), prompting future Defense Secretaries and Congress to attempt 
additional reforms. 
Packard Initiatives 
The military spending draw down in the late 1960s enunciated by the unpopular 
Vietnam War and rising cost of defense acquisition, prompted David Packard, then 
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) under the Nixon Administration, to 
recognize that the government needed a better way to manage the procurement of weapon 
systems and reduce cost growth (Ferrara, 1996:110).  In 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard 
“returned to the Services much authority for conducting the acquisition process” (Jones, 
1999:402).  He believed it was essential for the individual services to have autonomy 
over their programs, while Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) maintained some 
program oversight (Fox and Field, 1988:44).  To ensure careful evaluation and informed 
decisions were made before a program proceeded to the next phase, Secretary Packard 
developed the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) “to advise him of 
the status of each major defense system” (Fox & Field, 1988:44).  The group was also 
responsible for reviewing the management practices of major programs to determine if 
reform was needed. 
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In May 1970, Secretary Packard released a memorandum outlining further 
changes to streamline the acquisition process and reduce cost growth (Fox and Field, 
1988:44).  Many of the initiatives in Packard’s memorandum, such as decentralized 
program execution, streamlined management structures, and use of appropriate contract 
mechanisms, laid the foundation for the first DoD Directive 5000.1, “Acquisition of 
Major Defense Systems” (Ferrara, 1996:111).  Secretary Packard’s vision as outlined in 
the Directive is as follows: 
 Successful development, production, and deployment of major defense systems 
are primarily dependent upon competent people, rational priorities, and clearly 
defined responsibilities.  Responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major 
defense systems shall be decentralized to the maximum practicable extent 
consistent with the urgency and importance of each program. 
 
 The development and production of a major defense system shall be managed by 
a single individual (program manager) who shall have a charter that provides 
sufficient authority to accomplish recognized program objectives.  Layers of 
authority between program manager and his Component Head shall be 
minimum…[the] assignment and tenure of program managers shall be a matter of 
concern to DoD Component Heads and shall reflect career incentives designed to 
attract, retain, and reward competent personnel. (Ferrara, 1996:111) 
 
The final section of DoDD 5000.1 contained the following guidance: 
• Wherever feasible, operational needs shall be satisfied through the use of 
existing military or commercial hardware; 
 
• Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost, and 
schedule; 
 
• Logistic support shall be considered as a principal design parameter; 
 
• Schedules shall be structured to avoid unnecessary overlapping or 
concurrency; 
 
• Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible; 
 
• Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including 
risk; 
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• Source selection decisions shall take into account the contractor’s capability; 
 
• Develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis; and 
 
• Documentation shall be generated in the minimum amount to satisfy 
necessary and specific management needs (Ferrara, 1996:112). 
 
Under this directive, program managers were to “be given adequate authority to 
make major decisions, recognition and rewards for good work, and more opportunity for 
career advancement” (Fox and Field, 1988:45).  However promising this may have 
seemed, it produced few encouraging changes within the military services and established 
no accountability for weapon systems cost growth (Fox and Field, 1988: 45).  Ironically, 
Secretary Packard’s visions laid forth in his memorandum over 30 years ago still provide 
the underlining theme of current acquisition reform initiatives. 
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission) 
While many of the previous Executive-led reform studies focused on government 
procurement in general, the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, enacted in July 1969 by 
President Nixon due to strong public criticism of defense procurement, concentrated on 
weapon systems acquisition.  The Panel, dubbed the Fitzhugh Commission after its 
chairperson, Gilbert Fitzhugh, issued study reports that were “the first systematic 
evaluation of defense acquisition practices” (Reeves, 1996:16).  The commission was 
explicitly asked to comment on “defense procurement policies and practices, particularly 
as they relate to costs, time and quality” (Bair, 1994:11).  The Panel found that the 
department’s excessive centralization, the Secretary of Defense’s large span of control, 
and the many layers of management had “contributed to serious cost overruns, schedule 
slippages and performance deficiencies” (Fitzhugh report, 1970:2).  Essentially, the 
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commission’s recommendations were the undoing of many of the centralized business 
practices initiated by Robert McNamara ten years earlier. 
In addition to the advice for decentralization, the Panel accentuated the need for 
increased prototype testing, flexibility in choosing an acquisition strategy, more 
professional development of acquisition personnel, and expanded authority for program 
managers.  The report further recommended “that fixed price contracts should not be used 
in research and development efforts” because of the “high risks and many technical and 
engineering unknowns associated with these efforts” (Reeves, 1996:17).  Unfortunately, 
this particular recommendation was not accepted by the DoD and resulted in the near 
bankruptcy in the late 1980s of several defense contractors accepting fixed price 
contracts, including LTV Corporation and Northrop and Grumman.  Ironically, not until 
after these incidents did the DoD finally decide against the use of fixed price contracts. 
Of the Panel’s recommendations, exclusive of the non use of fixed price contracts 
previously described, most were embraced by the DoD and “virtually mirrored” (Bair, 
1994:13) the initiatives established by David Packard.  Many have implied that the 
Panel’s reports, because of their initiation by the President and support of the Congress, 
affirm the recommendations earlier issued by Packard.  However, because the Panel’s 
recommendations were left to the DoD to implement and did not require Congressional 
action, few of the initiatives were actually implemented.  In fact, similar 
recommendations were again made in the 1985 Packard Commission report, raising the 
question of implementation effectiveness of the Panel’s initiatives. 
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Commission on Government Procurement 
All previous major efforts to reform the acquisition process and reduce cost 
growth were directed by either the Secretary of Defense or the President.  The 
Commission on Government Procurement was the first such attempt by Congress and 
was designed as a comprehensive review of all government buying practices and 
procedures (Bair, 1994:13-14).  The creation of the commission was prompted by 
growing concern that the federal procurement practices were ineffective because a lack of 
uniformity and an increase in complexity.  The commission’s initial findings revealed: 
• Congress was ill-equipped to evaluate performance, costs, and schedule for 
new defense systems programs in the context of national security objectives 
and priorities. 
 
• Congress should establish an Office of Federal Procurement Policy headed by 
a presidential appointee to oversee procurement policies and systems. 
 
• Congress should consolidate all statutory procurement regulations into one. 
 
• DoD should upgrade the acquisition workforce by establishing an institution 
to provide necessary education and services. 
 
• DoD should reduce the management and administration layers between policy 
and program offices (Fox and Field, 1988:45). 
 
The commission’s report emphasized how uncoordinated and often inconsistent 
the procurement regulations, practices, and procedures were, and how the volumes of 
expensive paperwork continued to increase.  They also stressed the need to stem the 
growing procurement procedure complexity to make doing business with the government 
easier.  The commission reiterate numerous finding from the Fitzhugh commission 
reports, including the use of competitive negotiated contract methods, encouraging 
greater use multiyear contracts, government-wide professional development programs for 
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procurement personnel,  using metrics to report the progress and status of proposed 
changes, raising the small purchase and economic thresholds from $2,500 to $10,000,  
introduce an independent operational test and evaluation program, and increase the 
authority of program managers (Reeves,1996:18). 
Ironically, while many of the recommendations were moves in the right direction, 
pentagon officials still believed that DoD had already made internal shifts in their 
procurement practices from recommendations made earlier by the Fitzhugh commission, 
and that more time was needed to access their results before additional reforms were 
implemented.  The few recommendations by the commission that were finally 
implemented had lasting effects on the procurement process: Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy created (1974), Contract Disputes Act enacted (1978), Federal 
Acquisition Regulation system established (1980), Competition in Contracting Act 
enacted in (1984), and the legislative formation of the Federal Acquisition Institute 
(1993) (Bair, 1994: 15). 
Carlucci Initiatives 
The intensifying Cold War conflict fueled the defense spending increases during 
the last two years of the Carter Administration, and President Reagan’s campaign 
promise for accelerated defense buildup (Benson, 1996:19).  The rapid increase in 
defense spending brought with it a new round of changes in the acquisition process.  In 
1981, in order to manage these reforms, Secretary of Defense Weinberger ordered the 
Acquisition Improvement Task Force; also know as the Defense Acquisition 
Improvement Program (DAIP) or the Carlucci Initiatives, to “evaluate all facets of 
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defense acquisition” (Jones, 1999:406).  The team was headed by Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Frank C. Carlucci. 
The DAIP released a list of 32 management initiatives, aimed at decreasing 
weapons cost, reducing development time, and improving weapons support and 
readiness.  Of the initiatives proposed in Table 5, multiyear procurement contracts, 
greater contracting competition, stabilized programs, more realistic budgeting, and more 
fixed-price contracts were eventually established and instituted by DoD (Fox and Field, 
1988: 47-48).  
Table 5.  Carlucci Initiatives (Adams, 1984, 15) 
1. Reaffirm Acquisition Management Principles 17. Decrease DSARC Briefing and Data Requirements
2. Increase Use of Preplanned Product 18. Budget for Inflation
          Improvement 19. Forecast Business Base Conditions
3. Implement Multiyear Procurement 20. Improve Source Selection Process
4. Increase Program Stability 21. Develop and Use Standard Operation and 
5. Encourage Capital Investment to Enhance           Support Systems
          Productivity 22. Provide More Appropriate Design-to-Cost Goals
6. Budget to Most Likely Costs 23. Implement Acquisition Process Decisions
7. Use Economical Production Rates 24. Reduce DSARC Milestones
8. Assure Appropriate Contract Type 25. Submit MENS (later JMSNS) with Service POM
9. Improve System Support and Readiness 26. Revise DSARC Membership
10. Reduce Administrative Costs and Time 27. Retain USDR&E as Defense Acquisition 
11. Budget for Technological Risk           Executive
12. Provide Front-end Funding for Test Hardware 28. Raise Dollar Threshold for DSARC Review
13. Reduce Governmental Legislation Related 29. Integrate DSARC and PPBS Process
          Acquisition 30. Increase PM Visibility of Support Resources
14. Reduce number of DoD Directives 31. Improve Reliability and Support
15. Enhance Funding Flexibility 32. Increase Competition
16. Provide Contractor Incentives to Improve 33. Enhance the Defense Industrial Base 
          Reliability           (added 1984)  
The Carlucci initiatives addressed some of the longstanding causes of cost 
growth, and many of the themes made their way into the 1982 revision of the DoDD 
5000.1 series, which at the time was the foundation for defense acquisition guidance.  
The revisions reflected the principles and policies recommended by the Acquisition 
Improvement Program, and are evident in this excerpt from the 1982 DoDD 5000.1 
version: 
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 Improved readiness and sustainability are primary objectives of the acquisition 
process…. Reasonable stability in acquisition programs is necessary to carry out 
effective, efficient, and timely acquisitions.  To achieve stability, DoD 
Components shall conduct effective evolutionary alternatives, estimate and 
budget realistically, [and] plan to achieve economical rates of production. 
(Ferrara, 1996:119) 
 
Carlucci believed that in order for the changes to be successful, DoD not only 
needed procurement process changes, but also philosophical changes to confront the 
“traditional way of doing business” (Jones, 1999:407).  A July 1996 GAO report, 
assessing the effectiveness of the Carlucci initiatives, found that while the reforms were 
at least partially successful in improving parts of the acquisition process, many of the 
program managers responsible for implementing the changes felt that the reforms “had 
made little or no difference in the acquisition process” (Fox and Field, 1988: 48).  The 
report suggested that the “philosophical” changes Carlucci stressed had not been taken, 
and “senior-level commitment to change had not filtered down to the program 
management level” (Fox and Field, 1988:48).  GAO further emphasized the difficulty 
with implementing the reforms in an environment where “everyone was in a hurry to 
make short-term fixes” (Jones, 1999:407).  Perhaps the most telling comment in the 
GAO’s report was the perception that the “commitment to the improvement program had 
dissipated” (Munechika, 1997:8).  While only five years had passed since the Carlucci 
initiatives were implemented, DoD lost focus executing and monitoring the results; 
ultimately contributing to a perceived failure in the reforms (Holbrook, 2003:10). 
Grace Commission 
During President Reagan’s 1980 campaign run, he pledged to reduce federal 
budget spending by two percent through the identification and elimination of “waste, 
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extravagance, abuse, and outright fraud” in federal programs (Bair, 1994:16).  In 1982, to 
follow through with his promise, President Reagan established the President’s Private 
Sector Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC), also known as the Grace Commission, named 
after its chairperson, Peter J. Grace.  The group consisted of 161 chief executive officers 
of major corporations and private sector experts, and their aim was to identify ways the 
government could be more efficient and reduce costs; either through executive or 
legislative action (Holbrook, 2003:10).   
The Commission recommended 2,478 government reform initiatives to the 
President, with estimated cost savings of $424 billion over three years.  Of the 
recommendations only 112 pertained directly to DoD, and of these, 12 directly involved 
the acquisition process (US Congress, 1984).  The major acquisition reform initiatives are 
listed in Table 6: 
Table 6.  Grace Commission Recommendations (House Armed Services Committee, 
1985:3) 
1. Greater use of multiyear contracting to improve program stability
2. Prioritize all weapons systems
3. Streamline and strengthen the contract selection process
4. Upgrade cost estimating
5. Enhance the role, responsibility, authority and accountability of the PM
6. Increase the use of dual sources, throughout the life of the program
7. Increase emphasis on the Spare Parts Breakout Program to identify and obtain spare parts
    from sources other than the Prime Contractor
8. Consolidate responsibility for contract administration activity at the level of OSD
9. Simplify/streamline the 30,000 pages of regulation related to Defense procurement
10. Mandate use of common components, subsystems and equipment by all services
11. Eliminate the use of unnecessary military specifications
12. Outsource commercial functions  
The main focus of the Commission’s report was an emphasis on “sound business 
practices” and not slashing programs (Bair, 1994:16).  The report identified a compelling 
need to modernize and streamline the acquisition process, and overhaul the organization 
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structure by consolidating the procurement function at the OSD level.  Once again the 
reform theme shifted back to centralized management, as recommended by McNamara 
more than twenty years before.  The report asserted: 
The military services have never really bought into the need for central 
management by the SECDEF…Congress continually constricts DoD’s 
management prerogatives…weapons choices…and other major management 
decisions cannot be made in isolation from home district political pressures. 
(Grace Report, 1983:ii) 
 
Critics of the Commission’s claims charged that the estimated potential savings 
were overstated and that many suggestions were not improvements in efficiency or 
eliminations of waste, but rather characterized as changes in national policy (Bair, 
1994:17).  Opponents of the proposals suggested that congressional policy changes were 
necessary for the reforms to be successful, and that Congress would take little or no 
action to ratify any recommendations.  In addition, numerous senior DoD leaders 
believed that many of the recommendations were already being addressed and that the 
department was moving in the right direction under the Carlucci initiatives.  Ultimately, 
both the Grace and Carlucci recommendations lost steam and faded, while cost overruns 
continued to grow (Munechika, 1997:12). 
Packard Commission 
According to historical budget data from the Congressional Budget Office, 
between 1980 and 1985 Defense outlays increase over 88 percent.  With the tremendous 
increase in spending came several highly publicized procurement horror stories and cost 
overruns that created public doubt about the wisdom of DoD weapon systems purchases 
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(Jones, 1999:398).  According to one expert, there were many reasons for alarm in the 
Defense acquisition community: 
In the mid-1980s, an atmosphere of uncertainty, frustration, and apprehension 
pervaded the Pentagon and its contracting base, for each new day brought with it 
additional regulations and concerns that more errors would be uncovered by either 
the press of congressional auditors, investigators, and overseers…the logjam of 
procurement legislation awaiting implementation had become so great that the 
Pentagon and defense industry officials pleaded with Congress for a moratorium 
on further reform legislation. (Ferrara, 1996:119) 
 
In an effort to curb growing concern, President Reagan responded with the 
formation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense, better know as the Packard 
Commission, named after its chairperson, former Secretary of Defense David Packard 
(Benson, 1996:20).  The Commission’s mission was to “examine ways to improve 
defense management in general, and defense acquisition specifically” (Ferrara, 
1996:119).  Their focus was on “broad, structural changes rather than on the smaller 
issues of fraud, waste, and abuse,” which the group felt were symptoms rather than the 
cause of the problems (Jones, 1999:407).   
Less than one year after the Commission was organized, they submitted their final 
report to the President.  The principal recommendations were: 
• Create a new position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
(USD[A]) with responsibility for research, development, procurement and 
testing of all weapon systems. 
 
• Created acquisition executives (AEs) in each Service reporting to both the 
USD(A) and their Service Secretaries. 
 
• Create program executive officers reporting directly to the AEs, each 
overseeing a group of program managers. 
 
• Give the Chairman of the JCS more authority in acquisition matters, create a 
Vice Chairman, and create a Joint Requirements Management Board to 
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establish weapon systems requirements, with approval or rejection authority at 
each milestone (Jones, 1999:407). 
 
In addition to these recommendations, the Commission developed a “model of 
excellence for defense acquisition,” and provided a “formula for action” to make the 
process more efficient (Munechika, 1997:13).  Table 7 shows the Packard Commissions 
Formula for Action. 
Table 7.  Packard Commission’s Formula for Action 
A. Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures
      1. Create new Under Secretary of Defense for Acqusition position
      2. Each service should establish a comparable Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)
      3. Each SAE should appoint Program Executive Officers (PEO)
      4. Program managers report directly to PEOs
      5. Substantially reduce the number of acquisition personnel
      6. Recodify federal laws into a single, greatly simplified statute
B. Use Technology to Reduce Cost
      1. Emphasize building and testing prototypes to demonstrate new technology
      2. Operational testing should begin early in development
      3. Prototypes can provide a basis for improved cost estimating
C. Balance Cost and Performance
      1. Restructure Joint Requirements and Management Board leadership
      2. Joint Requirements Management Board should define weapon requirements and provide 
           tradeoff between cost and performance
D. Stabilize Programs
      1. Baseline programs and use multi-year funding
E. Expand the Use of Commercial Products
      1. Do not rely on military specifications
      2. Use off-the-shelf products as much as possible
F. Increase the Use of Competition
      1. Focus on more effective competition, modeled on commercial practices
      2. Emphasize quality and past performance as well as price
G. Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel
       1. Allow Secretary of Defense to establish flexible personnel management practices
       2. Recommend new personnel management system for acquisition personnel, 
        contracting officers and scientists and engineers  
Both the President and Congress responded very enthusiastically to the 
recommendations, and on October 1, 1986, President Reagan signed in to law the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, sweeping changes whose 
principal provisions were to implement the primary Packard Commission’s suggestions 
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(Jones, 1999:408).  Shortly after the Commission’s report and this Act, DoD ordered 
revisions to the DoD 5000.1 series to capture the efforts in the basic governing 
acquisition regulation.   
In 1990, a USD(A) report analyzing the reform progress provided specific 
positive examples of increased cost control and stronger program stability: 
• Multiyear contracting.  Seven multiyear programs were approved by Congress 
in the FY 1989 budget, saving an estimated $492 million.  Total savings from 
multiyear procurements from FY 1982 to FY 1989 exceed $7.5 billion. 
 
• Economic production rate.  Of the 34 major defense acquisition programs in 
the DoD, 30 were planed for procurement at or better than the minimum 
economic production rate (Munechika, 1997:15). 
 
After various progress reports on the Commission’s results were positive, and key 
DoD leadership touted the reform a success, President Reagan’s efforts were viewed by 
some as the most substantive defense acquisition reform achievements to date (Jones, 
1999:407).  However successful the Packard Commission’s efforts, they still were not 
without critics.  Many argued that little progress was made enhancing the quality of the 
DoD acquisition personnel (Munechika, 1997:15).  Also, a report published by 
Christensen et al. (1999) analyzing the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary data 
base for program cost growth, showed that the Packard Commissions results did not 
reduce cost overruns.  It would be the focus of the Bush Administration to aggressively 
investigation the “success” of the Commission’s efforts upon taking office in 1989 
(Holbrook, 2003:14). 
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Defense Management Review 
Early in 1989, President Bush directed Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to 
develop a plan to ensure the Packard Commission’s recommendations were fully 
implemented; and to further improve and more efficiently manage the defense acquisition 
system (Cheney, 1989:i).  The DoD in-house study was called the Defense Management 
Review (DMR).  It assessed from an analytical view how far along the DoD was in 
implementing the Commission’s recommendations, and what remained to be 
accomplished (Holbrook, 2003:14).  The DMR’s initial findings criticized management 
in the acquisition community for the undisciplined management process and 
overburdening regulations (Ferrara, 1996:121).  The Secretary released a list of changes 
that must be taken in order for the President’s objectives at improving the procurement 
system to work: 
• Teamwork among DoD’s senior managers; 
 
• Sound, longer-range planning and better means for managing available 
resources; 
 
• More discipline in what weapon systems we buy and how we buy them; 
 
• Better management of the people we rely on to produce such systems; 
 
• An environment that promotes steady progress in cutting costs and increasing 
quality and productivity; and 
 
• Adherence to the highest ethical standards (Cheney, 1989:27).   
 
DMR also instituted a list of improvements that included “streamlining the 
acquisition chain-of-command from the Defense Acquisition Executive through a newly 
created Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)”, having the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
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of Staff (JCS) lead the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to improve requirements 
generation and enhance weapon system performance validation, and strengthening the 
power of the Under Secretary for Acquisition (Hinnant, 1993:6; Jones, 1999:404).   
By the end of 1991 one of the DMR’s most influential initiatives, entitled 
“Streamlining Contract Management,” had been implemented.  Its aim, a 
recommendation proposed five years earlier by the Grace Commission; was to 
consolidate the Army, Navy, and Air Force contract administrations under a single 
organization – the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (Munechika, 1997:16).  Also in 
1991, came the release of the overhauled DoD 5000 series; a concerted effort to respond 
to the DMR’s critique (Ferrara, 1996:121).  The four main objectives of the re-write 
were: create a uniform system of acquisition policy, discipline the acquisition 
management process, streamline the acquisition regulatory regime, and address the litany 
of common complaints (Ferrara, 1996:121).  The focus of attention in the acquisition 
process after the DMR’s recommendation was a shift “to a more formalized report based 
interaction in which all necessary information would be transmitted in writing” (Ferrara, 
1996:121).  However, this method would later be reversed because of an increase in “red 
tape” and “bureaucracy”, which slowed down the acquisition process. 
Summary 
This section provided a brief overview of some of the major acquisition reform 
initiatives between 1960 and 1989.  From a historical point of view, it is evident that 
while the reform studies and commissions have changed names, many of the ideas and 
recommendations remained the same between McNamara (1961), Packard (1969 to 
1970), Fitzhugh Commission (1970), Commission on Government Procurement (1972), 
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Carlucci Initiatives (1981), Grace Commission (1983), Packard Commission (1986) and 
the Defense Management Review (1989). 
Current Acquisition Reform Overview (1991 to Today) 
This section defines the current acquisition reform period as those initiatives 
which were enacted from 1991 to 2003.  This section examines the National Performance 
Review (NPR), the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA), the Clinger-Cohen Act 
of 1996, and the DoDD 5000 series rewrites. 
National Performance Review (NPR) of 1993 and 1995 
The National Performance Review (NPR) focused on transforming the current 
procurement system into one which had more customer service, less bureaucracy, and 
was primarily based on getting value for money (Reinventing Federal Procurement, 
1993:7).  Five major themes were identified and provided the framework for 20 specific 
reform recommendations.  Table 8 identifies the five major NPR themes and summarizes 
some of the key recommendations. 
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Table 8.  NPR Procurement Reform Recommendations 
(Reinventing Federal Procurement, 1993) 
Move to Guiding Principles from Rigid Rules
PROC01 Reframe Acquisition Policy
     - Reduce rules and regulations
PROC02 Build an Innovative Procurement Workforce
      - Better education and training
PROC03 Encourage More Procurement Innovation
     - Test new methods with pilot programs
Get Bureaucracy Out of the Way
PROC04 Establish New Simplified Acquisition Threshold and Procedures
     - Low cost procedures for small purchases
PROC06 Amend Protest Rules
     - Increased communication between buyers and sellers
PROC08 Reform Information Technology Procurement
     - Decrease time to purchase computer equipment
Center Authority and Accountability with Line Managers
PROC09 Lower Costs/Reduce Bureaucracy in Small Purchases though Purchase Card Use 
     - IMPAC Card use
Create Competitive Enterprises
PROC12 Allow for Expanded Choice and Cooperation in use of Supply Schedules
     - Increase Number of Supply Sources
Foster Competitiveness, Commercial Practices, Excellence in Vendor Performance
PROC13 Foster Reliance on the Commercial Marketplace
     - Reduce reliance on government-specific specifications
PROC15 Encourage Best Value Procurement
     - Lowest bidder is not always best!
PROC16 Promote Excellence in Vendor Performance
     - Use past performance in contract award decisions
PROC18 Authorize multiyear contracts  
 “In December 1994, President Clinton asked Vice President Gore to conduct a 
second review of federal agencies, focusing on whether existing functions could be 
terminated, privatized, or restructured” (National Partnership for Reinventing 
Government, 1999:4).  Commonly referred to as Reorganizing Government Phase II 
(REGO II), this second review featured four concurrent efforts which are outlined in 
Table 9. 
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Table 9.  NPR Phase II Procurement Reform Efforts (Reinvention Roundtable 
1995:6)  
Agency Resturcturing (considers three questions)
- If your agency were eliminated, who would pusrue its goals?
- If we must retain this federal role, how can we improve customer service and reduce costs?
- What do you think your customers think about eliminations or changes?
Realigning Relationship of Federal Government with State/Local Partners
- Pass maximum authority and funding to states, localities, and individuals.
- If federal role required, the federal government will be a partner who "steers, not rows."
Regulatory Reform
- Regulators must change the regulatory culture.
Continued Implementation of NPR Phase I
- Agencies will continue to build on successes of NPR Phase I   
Actual NPR savings appear to be contested between federal agencies; however, 
the importance of the NPR as it relates to this study was that it reinvigorated the 
Acquisition Reform movement in the DoD (Holbrook, 2003:15). 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
“The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 significantly changed how the 
government does business.  As part of Vice President Gore's effort to create a 
‘Government That Works Better and Costs Less’ within his National Performance 
Review, he presented FASA to President Clinton in 1993.  It was designed to overhaul 
the cumbersome and complex procurement system of the federal government, which 
required costly paperwork for even small purchases and weeks, sometimes months, of 
waiting between order and delivery of goods” (FASA DSMC, 2002).  To this end, the act 
significantly modified or eliminated over 225 existing statutes. 
 “The themes behind the changes made by FASA are a preference for moving to 
commercial contracting methods, transitioning the procurement process to an electronic 
basis, eliminating paperwork burdens in the procurement cycle, and eliminating non-
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value-added requirements” (Statutory/Policy Changes 1999:1).  Table 10 highlights some 
of the changes included in the FASA of 1994. 
Table 10.  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA DSMC, 2002) 
- Eliminated paperwork and record keeping requirements for purchases under $100,000
- Allowed direct micropurchases of items below $2,500
- Exempted commercial procurements from certain cost accounting standards
     
- Reserved all acquisitions ($2,500 - $100,000) for small business concerns
- Expanded Small Disadvantaged Business program to civilian agency purchases
- Created Small Business Procurement Advisory Council
- Improved bid protest and contract administration procedures
- Required evaluation of past performance before contract award  
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
In 1996, Congress and the President enacted the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act, which are jointly 
known as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  Among other changes, this act required heads 
of Federal agencies to link information technology (IT) investments to agency 
accomplishments and establish a process to select, manage, and control IT expenditures 
(Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, DSMC, 2001).  The following quote by former Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Honorable Paul G. Kaminski, 
summarizes the act’s accomplishments. 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (formerly known as the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA) and the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act of 1996 (ITMRA)) further advance the changes 
made by FASA.  The Clinger-Cohen Act provides a number of significant 
opportunities for DoD to further streamline and reduce non-value added 
steps in the acquisition process.  Among the most significant changes 
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authorized by the Act is a test of the use of the Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures (SAP) for commercial items between the simplified acquisition 
threshold of $100,000 and $5 million.  This should allow DoD to reduce 
its administrative costs and overhead costs for DoD’s vendor base for 
purchases of relatively low risk items.  This change eliminated 
government-unique requirements previously cited by industry as a barrier 
to doing business with DoD.  The Act also provides the authority for 
contracting activities to use SAPs for all requirements between $50,000 
and the SAP while the government works to fully implement Electronic 
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI). (Clinger-Cohen 
DSMC, 2001) 
 
Overall, changes initiated by the Clinger-Cohen Act provided substantial relief 
from burdensome non-value added processes that increased the cost of information 
technologies acquisition (Clinger-Cohen DSMC, 2001). 
DoDD 5000 Series Rewrites 
 The DoD 5000 Series has served as the cornerstone for military asset acquisition 
since the 1970s.  In its original form, the 5000 Series “mandated a complicated 
acquisition process requiring the government to follow specific rules.  The Series also 
contained supplemental recommendations and suggested guidelines and other mandatory 
rules that applied only in certain circumstances.  The process was very detailed but was 
an attempt to ensure that the US Government purchase only the highest quality 
equipment” (DoD Directive 5000.1 and 5000.2-R Rewrite, 2001); however, continued 
efforts towards a more efficient acquisition system clearly identified the need to revise 
the Series. 
 In 1997, the first drastically revised 5000 Series was released to realign 
acquisition guidelines with current legislation.  The rewrite focused on the following four 
streamlined acquisition processes. 
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• It incorporated new laws and policies. 
• It separated mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices. 
• It reduced the volume of internal regulatory guidance. 
• It integrated, for the first time ever, acquisition policies and procedures for 
both weapon systems and automated information systems. (DoD Directive 
5000.1 and DoD 5000.2-R Rewrite, DSMC, 2001) 
 
This newly revised DoD 5000 series was dramatically simplified, going from more than 
1,000 pages in its original form to merely 160 pages with this revision. 
 In 2002 the 5000 series was again radically modified.  This time the entire 
publication was suspended from use until a more flexible guideline could be created.  In a 
October 30, 2002 memorandum, Undersecretary of Defense Wolfowitz canceled the DoD 
5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents stating “I have determined that the current 
subject documents require revision to create an acquisition policy environment that 
fosters efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation” (Wolfowitz, 2002). 
 A new DoD 5000 series emerged in 2003 to satisfy the functional criteria 
established by Undersecretary Wolfowitz.  Since the 2003 revision exceeds the scope of 
this research, the details will not be discussed in this report. 
Summary 
 Current period reform initiatives are not much different than their predecessors, as 
the push to eliminate bureaucracy for more effective acquisition seems to permeate from 
decade to decade.  From one current reform initiative to another, commonalities include 
streamlining regulatory guidelines, implementing commercial practices, and providing 
the end-user more flexibility. 
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Cost Growth Studies 
This section summarizes recent research studies that focus on quantifying cost 
growth in DoD acquisition and measuring the effectiveness of acquisition reform 
initiatives.  These studies provide the motivation and methodology for this research 
1993 Drezner Study 
The Drezner study attempted to identify the extent of a historical cost growth 
problem in DoD acquisition by focusing on two primary research objectives: 
• Quantify the magnitude of cost growth in weapon systems. 
• Identify factors affecting cost growth. 
Utilizing the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) as of December 1990, a 
database of 197 major weapon systems was compiled for cost growth analysis.  Two 
significant findings resulted from this study.  First, the researchers found “no substantial 
improvement in average cost growth over the last 30 years, despite the implementation of 
several initiatives intended to mitigate the effects of cost risk and the associated cost 
growth.  In fact, [their] results suggest that cost growth has remained about 20 percent 
over this time period” (Drezner 1993:xiv).  Second, “researchers could not definitely 
account for the observed cost growth patterns.  Thus, no ‘silver bullet’ policy option is 
available for mitigating cost growth” (Drezner 1993:xi); however, “the two factors that 
have the greatest effect on total program cost growth are program size and maturity” 
(Drezner 1993:xii). 
The 1993 Drezner study identified troubling results about cost growth in the DoD 
acquisition process.  To determine if the cost growth pattern continues through 2001, the 
RAND study is utilized as the template for this thesis research. 
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1999 Christensen et al. Study 
The research of Christensen et al. added further support for the 20 percent average 
annual cost growth identified in the 1993 Drezner report, finding similar results with the 
Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database as Drezner found with the 
SAR database (Christensen et al. 1999:251).  More specifically, this study analyzed an 
eight year window around the implementation of the Packard Commission’s 
recommendations to determine if cost growth improved because of these reform efforts.  
Their research identified that the Packard Commission’s recommendations “did not 
reduce the average overrun percent experienced on 269 completed defense acquisition 
contracts over an eight year period (1988 through 1995).  In fact, the cost performance 
experienced on development contracts and on contracts managed by the Air Force 
worsened significantly (Christensen et al. 1999:251).  Failure of the Packard 
Commission’s recommendations to control cost growth as designed reveals the need for 
continued monitoring of newly implemented acquisition reform efforts. 
2003 Holbrook Thesis 
The Holbrook study “focuses on the timeline of current reform initiative 
implementation, with an emphasis on cost reduction-focused initiatives.  This study 
assessed whether DoD weapon system contract cost performance was improving or not 
and how any cost performance trends (positive or negative) relate to the implementation 
timeline” (Holbrook 2003, 3).  The use of the DAES database enabled Holbrook to apply 
earned value management calculations to assess cost growth.  Although Holbrook used a 
different database and methodology than those applied in this study, his research provides 
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a unique perspective into the correlation of cost growth and acquisition reform.  
Holbrook’s thesis is based on two specific research objectives: 
First to determine if a mapping between cost initiatives and cost growth 
improvement exists and if so, what is the time period between implementation of 
an initiative and the results.  Second, based on this relationship the focus will be 
on developing a model or ‘rule of thumb’ to estimate or forecast an impact 
window or time frame in which to expect results for future cost-related acquisition 
reform policies. (Holbrook 2003, 4) 
 
His research focused on 204 contracts completed between January 1, 1994 and 
December 31, 2001 (Holbrook 2003, xi).  The analysis identified that cost growth was no 
different in contracts completed after acquisition reform implementation than it was in 
those contracts completed before acquisition reform implementation.  In addition, the 
research investigated cost performance on all active contracts from 1970 to 2002 with 
acquisition reform studies and commissions over the same time period to examine any 
trends or time lags between reform implementation and contract cost performance 
change.  The study results “indicate some evidence of cost performance change following 
the different studies and commissions” (Holbrook 2003, xi). 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter defined aircraft weapon systems and specified their relative impact 
on the DoD budget.  The chapter also identified the long history of acquisition reform 
initiatives up to 2003, revealing the legislative impact on the DoD acquisition process.  
Finally, recent cost growth studies were reviewed to establish a baseline viewpoint on the 
extent of weapon system cost growth in the DoD. 
This thesis utilizes the past cost growth studies identified above to identify if cost 
growth is still plaguing the DoD acquisition process today.  Hypothesizing that cost 
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growth will be found in the aircraft weapon systems from 1991 to 2001, further analysis 
will be performed to identify if acquisition reform initiatives have made any impact on 
reducing the amount of cost growth a program incurs.  The methodology for this research 
is described in Chapter III. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
Two fundamental questions arise when performing weapon system cost growth 
analysis: 1) how to accurately quantify cost growth, and 2) whether or not acquisition 
reform initiatives have made a difference on weapon system cost growth.  The issue of 
cost growth calculation centers on what adjustments must be made to normalize for 
inflation, changes in baseline quantities, and the phenomenon of cost improvements with 
increasing production quantities.  To determine if acquisition reform has impacted cost 
growth, pre-reform and post-reform periods of analysis must be identified.  This chapter 
gives a description of the database and data used, explains the adjustments and 
calculations of cost growth, and explains the phases of analysis conducted.   
Data Collection 
The cost growth analysis research relied on data from Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SAR), which are the primary documents submitted by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) to Congress regarding the status of major defense acquisition programs 
(MDAP) (Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  To minimize interpretive errors, this study used the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) 
cost growth database.  The OSD CAIG database compiles all historical SAR data into a 
Microsoft Excel workbook, while incorporating expert judgment in classifying many 
areas that are reliant on interpretation, such as quantity-related cost variances.  This 
electronic database not only facilitates specific program data extraction, but also 
mitigates some SAR limitations discussed in Chapter I. 
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MDAPs reporting SARs are acquisition programs that are “not highly sensitive 
classified programs” as determined by the Secretary of Defense but are: 
• Designated by the Secretary of Defense as a MDAP, or 
 
• Estimated by the Secretary of Defense to require an eventual total expenditure 
of more than $300 million (based on fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) or an 
eventual total expenditure for procurement of more than $1.8 billion (based on 
fiscal year 1990 constant dollars) (10 U.S.C., 2430). 
 
SARs are developed by the Program Management Offices (PMOs) and provide 
data on the cost, schedule, and performance status of MDAPs at regular intervals 
(Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  Annual SARs are mandatory for MDAPs 60 days after the date 
on which the President’s Budget is submitted to Congress, and cover data as of 31 
December.  Quarterly SARs are reported on an exception basis if the program meets the 
following criteria: 
• 15% or more increase in the procurement estimate of the Program Acquisition 
Unit Cost (PAUC) compared to the PAUC in the currently approved 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APBA), or 
 
• 15% or more increase in the current estimate of the Average Procurement Unit 
Cost (APUC) compared to the APUC in the currently approved APB, or 
 
• Six-month of greater delay in the current estimate of any schedule milestone 
since the current estimated reported in the previous SAR, or 
 
• Milestone B, Milestone C, or Full Rate Production Decision Review 
(Milestones II or III for grandfathered programs) and associated APB 
approval within 90 days prior to the quarter end date (DoD 5000.2-I). 
 
Data used in this study is from the 1991 through 2001 annual aircraft weapon 
system SAR reports and is current as of December 2001.  The schedule, technical, and 
cost information listed in the SAR is reported in terms of “baseline, approved program, 
and current estimates” (Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  For the purpose of this research the 
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sections on program acquisition costs, which include “all such costs from program 
inception to completion regardless of the program’s stage of development” (Hough, 
1992:4), are of interest and used in the data collection and analysis.  
Two estimates of cost are provided in a SAR and are allocated to the following 
appropriations: Development (RDT&E), procurement, and military construction 
(MILCON).  The first cost is a baseline estimate that can be made for each of the three 
Milestones: Milestone I (A) or the planning estimate (PE), Milestone II (B) or the 
development estimate (DE), and Milestone III (C) or production estimate (PE) (Hough, 
1992:4).  The second is “the current estimate that includes actual schedule, technical, and 
cost information for the most recent estimate available” (Jarvaise et al., 1996:3).  The 
costs are reported in both base year (BY) and then year (TY) dollars in millions.  The DE, 
or Milestone II (B) estimate, is associated with the Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) start, and has been the most common baseline for calculating cost 
growth: 
For many types of descriptive and statistical analyses, cost growth is referenced to 
the DE baseline since prior to Milestone 2 (B), capability and configuration trade-
offs are often still in the process of being resolved.  Using this baseline also 
establishes a weapon system of reasonably constant scope in cost growth 
analyses. (Jarvaise et al., 1996: 12) 
 
Therefore, the Milestone II (B) estimate is used as the baseline in this research. 
 
Finally, a change in the quantity of weapon systems from baseline to current 
estimates is reported each year in the program acquisition cost section of the SAR, and 
identifies the quantity of weapon systems to be procured for the given estimate as well as 
the baseline estimate (Hough, 1992:4).  Data from this section of the SAR report is used 
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when making quantity normalization adjustments covered in the Phase One section of the 
methodology. 
Phase I 
Research Objective 
Chapter II outlined a 1993 RAND report that measured MDAP cost growth from 
the mid-1960s to 1990 using SARs.  The research revealed that the average cost growth 
for all weapon systems was around 20 percent, while aircraft systems averaged 28 
percent.  To get a current measure of the state of aircraft weapon system cost growth, this 
phase of the study measures cost growth using aircraft system’s SARs from 1991 to 
2001.  
Population and Sample 
The data population for this research encompasses all aircraft weapon systems 
whose primary motivation is airframe production that reported SARs during 1991 to 
2001.  The samples selected from this population for Phase I includes only those 
programs with a reported Milestone II baseline.  A total of 78 aircraft weapon system 
SARs are included in this research. 
Data Normalization 
 Generally, cost growth is identified as the change between the baseline estimate 
and the current estimate.  There are two primary approaches to measuring cost growth: 
unadjusted costs and adjusted costs.  The unadjusted method measures cost growth in TY 
dollars and excludes any changes in procurement quantity or inflation.  The unadjusted 
procedure is used when measuring the impact of cost growth on the federal budget and is 
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favored by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and Congress “because it reflects the 
budgetary impact of all program cost changes regardless of what conditions are 
responsible for the change” (Hough, 1992: 10).  Adjusted cost growth is calculated in 
constant year (CY) dollars to eliminate the effects of inflation, and accounts for changes 
in procurement quantities.  The adjusted cost growth approach, which is modified and 
used in this research, is preferred when “determining how well program management has 
done in estimating and controlling costs” within its weapon system program (Drezner et 
al., 1993:10).   
A hybrid adjusted cost growth method is applied in this research, which adjusts 
procurement costs by deducting the primary and secondary quantity-related variances 
reported in the SAR and then normalizes the residual procurement variance along a cost-
quantity learning curve (Hough, 1992:39-40).  An explanation of the process is provided 
in the following paragraphs. 
  Inflation Adjustment 
The initial step in adjusting cost data using SARs is to remove the effects of 
inflation, which are outside the control of weapon system programs and serve only to 
disguise the true level of cost growth when left unadjusted.  The SAR provides data in 
both BY and TY dollars, so the effects of inflation can be overcome by extracting cost 
data and calculating cost growth factors in BY dollars (Jarvaise et al., 1996:20).  
However, a common occurrence within the SARs is that the baseline may change for a 
particular program.  Therefore, to perform cost growth analysis that will remain 
consistent throughout, all data calculations must be adjusted to a CY, thus eliminating the 
effects of changing baselines and inflation by removing changes in the value of money 
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over time (Drezner et al., 1993:21).  All values in this research are adjusted by applying 
the OSD CY 2000 inflation indices, and shown in dollars in millions. 
 
  Quantity Adjustment 
After the inflation adjustments have been made the next step in normalizing the 
data is to remove the effects of quantity changes from the baseline estimate.  While 
adjusting for inflation is fairly straightforward, the same cannot be said for quantity 
normalization; it is critical to explain exactly how the calculations are accomplished.  
General steps and formulas for calculating adjusted cost growth are provided in this 
chapter along with adjusted cost growth calculations using F-22 SAR data, as of 
December 2001, to illustrate the use of this model in practical context.  In addition, all 
aircraft weapon system adjusted cost growth and learning curve calculations are provided 
in Appendices A to N. 
Before initial adjustments are made, it must first be decided whether to recalculate 
the current estimate to the baseline quantity or to adjust the baseline quantity to the 
current quantity.  When normalizing to the current quantity, a floating baseline is created 
as the procurement quantity changes, which can lead to contrasting measures of cost 
growth when there are large changes in the production quantity.  On the other hand, 
normalizing to the baseline quantity will “theoretically give the same cost-growth factor 
whether subsequent quantities are increased or decreased” (Hough, 1992: 30).  This 
method is approved and used by most research firms conducting cost growth analysis, 
and is therefore adopted for this study. 
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Once a normalization quantity has been selected, the first procedure for adjusting 
the quantity is to calculate the current procurement variance (CPV).  This is 
accomplished by subtracting the baseline procurement estimate (BPROC) from the 
current procurement estimate (CPROC) as expressed by Equation 1 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
CPV = CPROC – BPROC          (1)
 
F-22 CPV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 SAR:  
 
-15097.34 = 37173.40 – 52270.74 
 
The second step is to calculate the current and cumulative quantity-related cost 
variances associated with procurement estimates from Section 13 of the SAR.  The 
variances in “RDT&E and military construction are not normalized because they are 
usually (but not always) independent of changes in the procurement quantity” (Hough, 
1992: 33).  There are two types of quantity related cost variances that must be considered; 
primary and secondary.   
Primary quantity-related cost variances (PQRCV) are costs increases or decreases 
that are directly attributed to a quantity change, and are identified in Section 13 of the 
SAR under the cost variance category “Quantity.”  Secondary quantity-related cost 
variances (SQRCV) are known costs effects of a quantity change, such as an increase in 
initial spare parts as a result of increase in procurement quantity that are not directly 
related with the end item, and thus not reported in the “Quantity” category (Hough, 1992: 
31).  The secondary quantity effects are reported under the schedule, engineering, and 
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estimating cost variances categories and can be subjectively identified as resulting from a 
quantity change by reading the current variance narrative explanations in Section 13 of 
the SAR.  The SAR database provided by OSD identified the secondary quantity-related 
variances extracted from the SAR cost variance narratives, and this thesis makes use of 
those values.   
Once the primary and secondary quantity-related variances are identified, a total 
quantity-related cost variance (TQRCV) is calculated by summing the primary and 
secondary quantity-related variances for each year as shown in Equation 2 (Leonard, 
2003). 
 
TQRCV = PQRCV + SQRCV          (2)
 
F-22 TQRCV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 
SAR:  
 
269.55 = 262.54 + 7.01 
 
A total quantity-related cumulative cost variance (TQRCVcum) must then be calculated by 
summing the TQRCV for all previous years as shown in Equation 3 (Leonard 2003). 
 
TQRCVcum = ∑
n
iTQRCV
1
           (3)
                                           i  = the ith year in sample 
                                           n = total number of years in the sample                  
 
F-22 TQRCVcum inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 SAR:  
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TQRCVcum = -20421.92 
 
The third step is to calculate a net procurement, or residual variance (RV), by 
subtracting the quantity-related variance from the total procurement variance.  The 
residual variance is the difference between the baseline estimate and current estimate 
after quantity-related costs are removed.  In essence, residual variance is non-quantity-
related cost variance and is expressed by Equation 4 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
RV = CPV - TQRCVcum          (4)
 
F-22 RV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 SAR:  
 
5324.58 = -15097.34 - -20421.92 
 
The fourth normalization step is to calculate the production learning curve slope 
(LCS) and theoretical first unit cost (T1).  These calculations are performed using the 
cumulative average learning curve theory methodology for lot data.  Cumulative average 
learning curve for lot data generally entails applying linear regression to the cumulative 
cost of producing a cumulative number of units.  The production learning curve and T1 
are created from the regression output.  The LCS is “the constant factor by which cost 
decreases as the production units double and is usually expressed as a percentage” 
(SCEA, 2002:6).  This concept is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Cumulative Average Learning Curve Slope (McCrillis, 2003) 
Normalizing using the LCS affects the data by either increasing or decreasing the 
amount of a program’s cost variance. A weapon system’s baseline cost “is established 
assuming a specific quantity of units.  As the number of units increases, the unit cost will 
go down even though the program cumulative total cost increases.  As the number of 
units decreases, the unit cost increases even though the program cumulative total 
decreases” (McCrillis, 2003).  This concept is shown in Figure 3 for a notational baseline 
program.   
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Figure 3.  Baseline Program Normalization (McCrillis, 2003) 
The lines above and below the baseline program line in Figure 3 represent 
programs with positive and negative cost growth.  The significance of adjustment 
depends on the “percentage of quantity change, how early in the program the quantity 
changed, the direction of the quantity change, and the steepness of the slope” (Hough, 
1992:35).   
To access whether a program has experienced cost growth or cost reductions, the 
variances must be normalized back to the baseline quantity.  The basic steps for 
determining a LCS are listed below: 
• Gather available data and normalize it (e.g., convert to CY dollars), as 
necessary; 
 
• Perform any necessary operations on the data and transform into log space; 
 
• Plot the data to determine if learning curve analysis is suitable (should 
approximate a line in log space); 
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• Determine the log-space linear equation, generally using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression; 
 
• Transform the result back into unit space; and 
 
• Finally, calculate your answers (SCEA Module 7, 2002:11). 
 
Data required for developing a LCS is provided in the procurement breakout of 
Section 16 (Program Funding Summary) in the SAR.  This section, which became 
regularly available beginning with the December 1985 SAR, displays the fiscal-year 
procurement quantities and funding numbers for both completed (i.e., “actual”) and 
future-years production.  In some cases, limiting the LCS calculations to completed 
production years will result in an insignificant number of data points.  Therefore, the 
preferred method is to use the entire procurement breakout, with both completed and 
projected production cost and quantities, which will produce more realistic and robust 
total cost-quantity curves.  In addition, when developing a LCS to normalize the current 
estimate to the baseline quantity, the current estimated Program Funding Summary data 
from the most recent SAR should be applied (Hough, 1992: 34). 
Once Program Funding Summary data has been assembled from Section 16 of the 
SAR, the cumulative average unit cost (CAUC) and cumulative units produced (CUP) 
must be calculated for each year.  The CAUC is calculated by summing the cost of all 
lots up to and including the current one and then dividing by the CUP.  The CAUC and 
CUP must then be transformed into log space (SCEA, 2002:19). 
The next step is to plot the log-space data using a scatter plot to determine if the 
data reasonably approximates a straight line.  The ln(CUP) is plotted on the horizontal 
axis and the ln(CAUC) on the vertical axis (SCEA, 2002:14).  For normalizing cost 
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growth data, a coefficient of determination of 0.70 or higher is generally accepted 
(Hough, 1992:39), and goodness of fit regression statistics can be used to determine if the 
data is statistically significant.  In any case where the fit does not meet the criteria, the 
average LCS for that type of system can be used (Hough, 1992:39). 
After the data has been deemed acceptable for cumulative average theory, 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression can determine the line passing through the log-
space data points; providing the y-intercept and slope of the line.  This operation can 
easily be done with Microsoft Excel regression analysis and most statistical software 
packages.  The y-intercept and slope of the line are the two key data points that must be 
transformed back to unit space (SCEA, 2002:15). 
Transforming the y-intercept back to unit space provides the T1, which is used to 
best fit the available historical data.  Transformation is done by exponentiating the y-
intercept as shown in Equation 5 (SCEA, 2002:16). 
 
 
 
 
To arrive at the LCS, the percentage by which cost decreases as production units double, 
the value two is raised to the log-space slope multiplied by the natural log of two as 
expressed in Equation 6 (SCEA, 2002:16).  How the T1 and LCS are used in the 
normalization process is addressed later in this chapter. 
 
T1 = eln(a)                                   (5) 
                                              e  = natural log base  
                                         ln(a) = log-space y-intercept                                         
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F-22 LCS calculations in BY 1996 dollars in millions from SAR program funding 
summary data are shown in Table 11. 
Table 11.  F22 LCS Calculations 
Lot 
Num
Cum 
Units 
Cum 
PROC 
Base Yr 
Cost CAUC
Ln 
Cum 
Units Ln(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-
intercept 
(lna) T1
Learn 
Curve
1 2 711.10 355.55 0.69 5.87 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 12 2924.80 243.73 2.48 5.50 -0.21 6.02 411.47 0.86
3 25 5273.50 210.94 3.22 5.35 -0.21 6.02 410.00 0.87
4 48 8795.80 183.25 3.87 5.21 -0.21 6.02 410.30 0.87
5 75 12252.90 163.37 4.32 5.10 -0.21 6.02 413.18 0.86
6 107 15735.30 147.06 4.67 4.99 -0.22 6.04 418.04 0.86
7 147 19126.90 130.11 4.99 4.87 -0.23 6.06 426.59 0.85
8 203 23205.60 114.31 5.31 4.74 -0.24 6.08 438.12 0.85
9 259 26919.90 103.94 5.56 4.64 -0.25 6.11 449.54 0.84
10 315 30217.70 95.93 5.75 4.56 -0.26 6.13 460.47 0.84
11 333 31277.70 93.93 5.81 4.54 -0.26 6.15 468.41 0.83  
 
The calculations above result in a T1 BY cost of $468.41 and a learning curve 
slope of 0.83.  For consistency, the T1 is converted to CY 2000 dollars in millions: CY 
T1 = $556.70. 
The fifth step is to compute the theoretical cost of the baseline quantity (TCBQ) 
by applying the production learning curve and the T1 values as expressed by Equation 7 
(Leonard, 2003).  This equation was adopted from previous RAND research on cost 
growth calculations and estimates the theoretic cost of the baseline program quantity, 
given the current production learning curve. 
 
LCS = eb*ln(2)                                   (6) 
                                               e = natural log base 
                                               b = log-space slope                                                  
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TCBQ = BQ * T1 * BQ^(ln(LCS)/ln(2))         (7)
 
F-22 TCBQ calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 SAR:  
 
65822.16 = 648 * 556.70 * 648^(ln(.83)/ln(2)) 
 
The sixth step is to compute the theoretical cost of the current quantity (TCCQ) 
by applying the production learning curve and the T1 values as expressed by Equation 8 
(Leonard, 2003).  This equation was adopted from previous RAND research on cost 
growth calculations and estimates the theoretic cost of the current program quantity given 
the current production learning curve. 
 
TCCQ = CQ * T1 * CQ^(ln(LCS)/ln(2))        (8)
 
F-22 TCCQ calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 SAR:  
 
40292.03 = 333 * 556.70 * 33^(ln(.83)/ln(2)) 
 
The final step is to identify the calculated quantity-related cost variance 
(CQRCV), which represents the theoretical value of cost growth relative to the baseline 
estimate at the baseline quantity, and is expressed by Equation 9 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
CQRCV = RV * TCBQ/TCCQ         (9)
 
F-22 CQRCV calculations inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 
SAR:  
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8698.38 = 5324.60 * 65822.16/40292.03 
 
 
Research Variable 
Once the normalization adjustments are made to the data, the research variable, 
adjusted cost growth factor (ACGF), can be calculated for each SAR year.  Adjusted cost 
growth can be represented in many ways: dollars, percentage, or as a factor.  This 
research focuses on adjusted cost growth as a factor of the baseline estimate and is 
calculated by summing the current RDTE estimate (CRDTE), the BPROC plus the 
CQRCV, and the current MILCON (CMILCON) estimate, then dividing by the sum of 
the baseline RDTE (BRDTE), BPROC, and the baseline MILCON (BMILCON) as 
shown in Equation 10 (Leonard, 2003). 
 
 (10)            BMILCON)BPROC(BRDTE               
/))((ACGF
++
+++= CMILCONCQRCVBPROCCRDTE
  
F-22 ACGF calculation inflated to CY 2000 dollars in millions from 2001 SAR:  
 
1.22 = (27346.34 + (52270.74 + 8698.38) + 428.16)/ 
(20464.26 + 52270.74 + 240.27) 
 
The ACGF calculations are performed on each SAR submission for all programs 
in the research sample, thereby identifying annual ACGFs as well as total program 
ACGFs.  An ACGF greater than 1.0 represents a program that incurred cost growth, 
while an ACGF less than 1.0 identifies favorable cost performance within a program.  All 
aircraft weapon systems ACGF calculations are shown in Appendices A to N. 
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Phase I Summary 
This section identified the Phase I research objective and established the research 
population, sample, and variable.  A detailed description of the methodology with 
equations and examples for data normalization to adjust for inflation, quantity changes, 
and cost improvements over time are provided.  Finally, an explanation for quantifying 
adjusted cost growth as a factor was given.  
Phase II 
 
Research Objective 
Chapter II identified DoD acquisition reform attempts from 1991 to 2001 aimed at 
streamlining the procurement process and reducing weapon systems cost growth.  A 
GAO report to Congress measuring the success of key Federal Acquisition Streamlining 
ACT (FASA) initiatives as of the end of fiscal year 1996, indicates “that the 
organizations [they] reviewed were working toward achieving key FASA purposes,” and 
“to reach meaningful conclusions about the extent of success…additional data would 
have to be collected and examined for subsequent fiscal years” (GAO/NSIAD-98-81:3).  
In another report on reform status in a 1997 statement before the House Committee on 
National Security, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (USD, AT&L) Kaminski stated: “DoD has achieved a large measure of success 
with acquisition reform,” and the “Department has made a number of critical and 
historical changes that are now being institutionalized and beginning to bear fruit” 
(Kaminski, 1997).  Additionally, a 1997 GAO report on the effect of acquisition reform 
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on weapon system funding identified that $7.20 billion in cost reductions from approved 
budgets were expected between fiscal year 1995 and 2002 (GAO/NSIAD-98-31:2).   
The second objective of this thesis is to analyze if current acquisition reform 
initiatives have indeed had any impact on aircraft weapon systems cost growth.  Thus, a 
cut-off treatment date, as well as pre-reform and post-reform analysis windows, must be 
identified for cost growth comparison.  The broad and encompassing policy changes of 
1991 to 2001 naturally occur over time, and it is “nearly impossible to determine a 
precise date of implementation for the aggregate change” (Searle, 1997:44).  As a result, 
consistent with the Holbrook and Searle studies, this date is judgmentally selected as 31 
December 1996 (Holbrook, 2003:35; Searle, 1997:45).  The cut-off treatment date for 
this study is chosen for the following reasons: 
• GAO report that as of the end of fiscal year 1996 the DoD was in compliance 
with FASA and that additional data would need to be collected and examined 
for subsequent years; 
 
• Passage of Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996; 
• DoDD 5000 Series revision released in 1997; 
• Speech by USD, AT&L Kaminski regarding success to date in 1997; and 
• GAO report estimating $7.20 billion reduction in budget from 1995 to 2002 
due to the effects of acquisition reform on weapon system funding. 
 
This cut-off treatment date allows for six years of pre-reform and five years of 
post reform SAR treatment data in the study, and provides enough time to mitigate bias 
due to factors such as fluctuations in the defense business cycle (Wandland & Wickman, 
1993:28).  Therefore, this study will use various statistical techniques to test aircraft 
weapon systems cost growth for the pre-reform period samples (1 January 1991 to 31 
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December 1996) to the after re-form period samples (1 January 1997 to 31 December 
2001) in order to make inferences about the difference between population cost growth 
parameters if one exists. 
Population and Sample 
The data population for this research encompasses all aircraft weapon systems 
that reported SARs during 1991 to 2001.  A pre-reform and post-reform sample is 
selected from this population for Phase II.  The pre-reform sample includes only those 
programs from 1991 to 1996 that reported a Milestone II baseline estimate.  A total of 13 
aircraft weapon systems and 43 SARs are included in the pre-reform sample.  Similarly, 
the post-reform sample includes only those programs from 1997 to 2001 that reported a 
Milestone II baseline estimate.  A total of 7 aircraft weapon systems and 35 SARs are 
included in the post-reform sample  
Research Variable 
This study analyzes the impact of acquisition reform on cost growth and utilizes 
the mean pre-reform ACGFs (mean ACGFpre-reform) and the mean post reform ACGFs 
(mean ACGFpost-reform) as the research variables.  Generating these two research variables 
requires two mathematical steps.  First calculate the mean annual ACGF as expressed by 
Equation 11. 
 
nACGFACGF
n
ij /
1






= ∑           (11) 
                                           i  = the ith ACGF in sample year j 
                                           n = total number of programs in year j                          
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Then calculate the mean ACGF for pre-reform and post-reform samples as expressed by 
Equations 12 and 13. 
 
nACGFACGF
n
ireformpre /
1






= ∑−           (12) 
                                           i  = the ith year in sample 
                                           n = total number of years in sample                               
 
nACGFACGF
n
ireformpost /
1






= ∑−           (13) 
                                           i  = the ith year in sample 
                                           n = total number of years in sample                               
 
The research variables mean ACGFpre-reform and ACGFpost-reform are then analyzed in a 
hypothesis test to determine the impact of acquisition reform on cost growth. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
Research question:  Is the mean ACGF for pre-reform (1 January 1991 to 31 
December 1996) aircraft weapon systems different than the mean ACGF for post-reform 
(1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001) aircraft weapon systems?  To answer this 
question, the following hypothesis is tested: 
Ho: mean ACGFpre-reform = mean ACGFpost-reform 
Ha: mean ACGFpre-reform ≠ mean ACGFpost-reform 
If the null hypothesis is true, then there is no statistical difference in cost growth between 
the pre and post reform periods.  This would indicate that current acquisition reform 
initiatives did not significantly impact cost growth.  If the alternate hypothesis is true, 
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then there is a statistical difference between the pre and post reform periods.  This would 
indicate that current acquisition reform initiatives did impact cost growth. 
Statistical Analysis 
The principal analysis used in Phase II involves applying statistical tests to 
determine whether significant differences exist between population means.  The first step 
in the analysis is to determine if the required assumptions are met to perform either 
parametric or nonparametric techniques.  Parametric statistical tests, like the z-test for 
large samples (n > 30) and t-test for small independent samples (n < 30), involve making 
inferences about population parameters when the data sampled are from a normally 
distributed population.  Nonparametric tests, like the Wilcoxon rank sum test (a.k.a. the 
Mann-Whitney test) for making inferences about two population means and commonly 
referred to as distribution-free tests, do not require the data to be normally distributed 
(McClave et al., 2001:888). 
If the two population means have samples where (n > 30) the z-test can be used 
since the Central Limit Theorem states that “for sufficiently large samples the sampling 
distribution of the sample mean is approximately normal” (McClave et al., 2001:273).  
However, if (n < 30) for the two population means the small sample t-test must be used 
and an assessment of normality and equality of variance must be conducted (McClave et 
al., 2001:399).  Since (n < 30) for the data in this research, tests to determine the 
appropriateness of the small sample t-test will be conducted.  
The small sample t-test is the appropriate parametric statistical test for comparing 
two populations with independent sampling and small sample sizes (Sheskin, 2000:247).  
In order to use the parametric small sample t-test, several assumptions must be validated: 
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both sampled populations must be approximately normally distributed with equal 
population variances, and the random samples must be selected independently of each 
other (McClave et al., 2001:399).  If the assumptions are met and the small sample t-test 
result is significant we can conclude with confidence that “there is a high likelihood that 
the samples represent populations with different means” (Sheskin, 2000:247).  
If the assumption of normality is violated for the small sample t-test, then an 
analogous nonparametric test like the Wilcoxon rank sum test can be used (McClave et 
al., 2001:895).  It can be proven “that the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the Mann-Whitney 
U test are equivalent” (McClave et al., 2001:897), and “although they employ different 
equations and different tables, the two versions of the test yield comparable results 
(Sheskin, 2000:289).  There are a number of assumptions necessary for the validity of the 
Wilcoxon ran sum test: the two samples are random and independent, and the two 
probability distributions from which the samples are drawn are continuous (McClave et 
al., 2001:897).  The Wilcoxon rank sum test is considered by many statisticians to be the 
best nonparametric method used to test the hypothesis that the probability distributions 
associated with two populations are equivalent (Gibbons, 1971:149).   
The hypothesis testing applied in this thesis will use an observed significance 
level (alpha value [α]) of .05.  The appropriate test statistic values will be given, and will 
be explained using p-values.  The p-value for a specific statistical test is the “probability 
(assuming Ho is true) of observing a value of the test statistic that is at least contradictory 
to the null hypothesis” (McClave et al., 2001:354), and is the smallest level of 
significance at which the null hypothesis would be rejected (Devore, 2000:342).  If the 
observed p-value is less than the alpha level (.05), reject the null hypothesis; otherwise do 
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not reject the null hypothesis (McClave et al. 2001: 356).  Table 12 displays the 
acceptance and rejection criteria for the tests using p-values. 
Table 12  Hypothesis Test Decision Table (Holbrook, 2003:44) 
P-value ≤ .05 ⇒ reject H0 at level .05 
P-value > .05 ⇒ do not reject H0 at level .05
 
Data Preparation 
Prior to conducting hypothesis testing, the parametric and nonparametric test 
assumptions must be compared.  Validation of the small sample t-test requires that the 
data be assessed for independence, randomness, normality and constant variance.  If the 
test for normality or constant variance is not met, the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum 
test will be used.  Assumptions for both the parametric small sample t-test and 
nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test are displayed in Table 13. 
Table 13.  Assumptions 
small sample t-test Wilcoxon rank sum test 
1.  All samples are random samples 
from their respective populations. 
1.  All samples are random samples 
from their respective populations. 
2.  All samples are independently 
selected from their respective 
populations. 
2.  All samples are independently 
selected from their respective 
populations. 
3.  Both sampled populations have 
relative frequency distributions that 
are approximately normal. 
3.  The two probability distributions 
from which the samples are drawn 
are continuous. 
4.  The population variances are 
equal.   
 
Independence 
Independence of the data was assumed based on the following: 
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• Likeness caused by legislation and regulation would affect cost performance 
equally across all DoD programs; and 
 
• Multiple programs under similar program managers are run by a multitude of 
cost management contractors and personnel (Searle, 1997:58-59). 
 
The characteristics of the population data, and subsequent sample data used in this study, 
are the same.  All DoD aircraft weapon systems are managed under the same legislation 
and regulations, and it is the attempt of this research to determine if these changes have 
impacted cost growth by comparing pre-reform and post-reform periods.  Additionally, 
within each weapon system program there are numerous groups performing cost 
management and estimating tasks, including support contractors, financial management 
personnel, and engineers, all with varying degrees of experience and training.  Therefore, 
the assumption of independence can be established.  Despite all of the variables that 
support the assumption of independence in this data, it is important to acknowledge the 
possibility that the samples may not be independent; thereby, potentially skewing the 
analysis results. 
Random sample 
A random sample is defined as one which “ensures that every subset of fixed size 
in the population has the same chance of being included in the sample” (McClave et al., 
2001:16).  Since this research contains the entire population of aircraft systems in the 
SAR database from 1991 to 2001, the extracted data cannot be truly random.  However, 
given the statistical limitations of working with “real” data and the complete utilization of 
existing population data, the random sample requirement is assumed.  It is important to 
note that failure to meet the random sample requirement may skew analysis results. 
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Normality 
The normality requirement will be tested both subjectively and objectively.  The 
subjective analysis consists of generating normal probability plots, which provide a 
graphical display of the data.  A straight line would indicate the potential existence of a 
normal distribution, while a nonlinear configuration would indicate the contrary 
(D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:35).  This graphical representation serves only as an 
informal preliminary judgment of normality and should always be accompanied by a 
formal normality test (D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:41, 405). 
The Shapiro-Wilks test for normality constitutes the formal objective test and is 
preferred over less accurate tests such as the chi square and Kolmogorov-Smimov tests.  
Overall, the Shapiro-Wilks test is probably the most powerful non-graphical test of 
normality (D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:41, 406).  The null hypothesis for the Shapiro 
Wilks test is that the data is normally distributed, while the alternate hypothesis is that the 
data is not normally distributed (D’Agosto and Stephens, 1986:41, 368).  The resulting p-
value from this test indicates the significance of any normality violations and is identified 
by a p-value that is less than or equal to the established alpha level. 
Equality of Variance 
The method for testing homogeneity of variance is dependent on the normality of 
the populations being analyzed; assuming independence and random sample 
requirements are met.  If the populations are both normally distributed then the F-Test for 
equal population variances would be employed.  The F-Test uses the ratio of population 
variances as the test statistic to assess if there is equal variance between the populations 
(McClave et al., 2001:435-436).  If the F-Test reveals equality of variance and all other 
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assumptions are met, the parametric small sample t-test using a pooled sample estimator 
of the variance can be used. 
If a population’s Shapiro Wilks test revels that the data is non-normally 
distributed, which past cost growth research has indicated (Christensen and Templin, 
2002:108), then the Levene Test for homogeneity of variance will be used because it is 
less sensitive to violations of normality (Neter et al., 1996:112).  While the assumption of 
equality of variance is not required when performing the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank 
sum test, the results of the Levene Test for homogeneity of variance can provide a 
general description about the data’s consistency. 
Phase II Summary 
This section identified the Phase II research objective and detailed the 
methodology utilized to determine if acquisition reform initiatives have made an impact 
on aircraft weapon system cost growth.  The hypothesis testing treatment methods were 
defined, and the assumptions necessary for appropriate model selection, either the 
parametric two sample t-test or nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test, was discussed.   
Chapter Summary 
This chapter detailed the methodology utilized to conduct each phase of the 
analysis.  Phase I focused on generating ACGFs for each aircraft weapon system for all 
relevant years in the research window.  Subsequently, Phase II utilized the ACGFs from 
Phase I to test if current acquisition reform initiatives have made any impact on aircraft 
weapon system’s cost growth.  Results of these analyses are provided in Chapter IV. 
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IV.  Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis for each phase of the 
research.  An analytical summary of the statistical test results are presented as either 
tabular or graphical images for each individual phase.  
Phase I 
The purpose of Phase I was to calculate adjusted aircraft weapon system cost 
growth factors from the 1991 to 2001 Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), using a hybrid 
adjusted cost growth model.  The data population for this research contains of all aircraft 
weapon system programs that reported SARs during 1991 to 2001.  The samples selected 
for Phase I includes only those programs with a reported Milestone II baseline.  A total of 
13 aircraft weapon systems, with 78 reported SARs, were identified for this treatment 
period, and the adjusted cost growth factors (ACGF) are presented in Table 14. 
Table 14.  Annual Adjusted Cost Growth Factors  
Program 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
B1-B (Lancer) 1.00 1.03
C130-J (Hercules) 1.31 1.29 1.38 1.38 1.05
C-17 (Globemaster III) 1.43 1.61 2.52 2.47 2.26 2.23 2.26 2.21 2.22 2.22 1.96
KC-135R (Stratotanker) 0.81 0.82 0.82 0.82
AV-8B (Harrier) 0.91 0.92
AV-8B (Harrier Remanufacture) 1.08 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.03
F-14D (Tomcat) 1.27 1.27 1.26
F-16 (Fighting Falcon) 1.98 1.95 1.98 2.02
F-22 (Raptor) 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.22
FA-18 E/F (Super Hornet) 1.00 1.01 1.02 0.97 0.95 0.48 0.48 0.73 0.77
FA-18 (Hornet) 1.52 1.56 1.57 1.56
T-6A (JPATS) 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.79
T-45-TS (Goshawk) 1.57 1.59 1.73 2.26 2.25 2.25 2.16 2.05 2.33 2.33 2.29
Average Annual ACGF 1.31 1.30 1.48 1.59 1.53 1.42 1.39 1.30 1.36 1.39 1.30  
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The sampling distribution of the data set in Table 14 is comprised of the 78 aircraft 
weapon systems ACGFs, which create the population distributions for the eleven annual 
means, and hence the random variable under study in Phase II. 
One of the research objectives of this thesis was to compare the 1993 RAND cost 
growth analysis results for aircraft weapon systems, which averaged 28 percent and 
covered the late 1960s to 1990, to that of aircraft weapon systems for the current research 
treatment period of 1991 to 2001.  Averaging all current aircraft weapon system adjusted 
cost growth factors (ACGF) produced an overall average for the treatment period of 40 
percent; which is 12 percentage points higher than the historical RAND results of 28 
percent.   
Phase II 
The objective of Phase II was to determine if current acquisition reform initiatives 
have impacted the mean annual ACGFs for aircraft weapon systems.  The mean annual 
ACGF for each year is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Average Annual Aircraft Adjusted Cost Growth Factors 
The objected in Phase II was accomplished by performing a hypothesis test 
between the ACGFs of the pre-reform period (1 January to 31 December 1996) to the 
mean ACGFs of the post-reform period (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001).  Table 15 
provides statistics on the aircraft weapon systems available from SARs during the 
treatment periods that meet all requirements listed for this research. 
Table 15.  Study Sample Statistics 
Group Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
(1 Jan 91 - 31 Dec 96) (1 Jan 97 - 31 Dec 01)
# Programs 11 7
# SARs 43 35
Sample Means 1.44 1.35
Sample Std Dev 0.12 0.05  
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The post-reform ACGF mean of 1.35 is less than the pre-reform ACGF mean of 
1.44.  However, to make a correct inference as to whether a significant difference exists 
between the two periods a statistical hypothesis test must be conducted.  Before a 
hypothesis test can be administered, it must be determined whether to use a parametric or 
nonparametric statistical test.  In order to accurately assess whether a parametric or 
nonparametric hypothesis test is appropriate, the assumptions of normality and equality 
of variance are tested using a statistical software package, JMP 5.1.  The assumption test 
outputs and corresponding p-values are provided.  The assumptions of independence and 
randomness were assumed as stated in Chapter III, therefore no formal tests are 
conducted.  
Normality 
Normality of the six pre-reform means and five post-reform means was tested 
both subjectively and objectively.  The subjective test consisted of generating normal 
probability plots for both the pre-reform and post-reform samples as shown in Figure 5.  
Since the data points from each sample period form a relatively straight line, it is likely 
that the samples are normal.  This is to be expected since the sampling distribution of 43 
pre-reform and 35 post-reform ACGFs are large enough to approximate a normal 
distribution of the pre-reform and post reform sample means. 
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Pre-Reform Normality Post-Reform Normality
 
Figure 5.  JMP 5.1 Normality Plots 
 
The objective test consisted of using the Shapiro-Wilks Test for Normality and 
the test results are displayed in figure 6. 
Pre-Reform Normality
                     
Post-Reform Normality
 
Figure 6.  JMP 5.1 Shapiro Wilks Test Results 
The p-value in the pre-reform sample of .5541 and post-reform sample of .1231 
are clearly greater than the established alpha level of 0.05, which indicates that both 
samples originate from a normal distribution.  Since the parametric small sample t-test 
assumption of normality is validated, the F-Test for equal population variances is 
employed to check the equality of variance assumption. 
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Equality of Variance 
The F-test for equal population variances can be conducted on the sample data set 
since the assumptions that the two populations are normally distributed and randomly and 
independently selected from their populations, have been satisfied (McClave et al., 
2001:436).  The F-test compares the population variances by making inferences about the 
ratio of the sample variance.  An F-test for equality of variance was conducted using JMP 
5.1.  The F-test results are displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  JMP 5.1 F-Test Results 
Since the F-test two sided p-value of .0880 is greater than the established alpha 
level of 0.05, the equality of variance assumption is satisfied and the data appears 
stationary.  The parametric small sample t-test, with a pooled sample estimator of the 
variance, can now be conducted to compare the pre-reform and post-reform means. 
 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The small sample t-test is an inferential statistical test employed to evaluate 
whether the two independent samples represent two populations with different mean 
values (Sheskin, 2000:247).  The small sample t-test used in this research to determine if 
pre-reform and post-reform ACGF means are the equivalent, is a non-directional two-
tailed test.  If the test results are significant, one can conclude that there is a high 
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likelihood that the two sample means are different.  The small sample t-test JMP 5.1 
results are displayed in Figure 8. 
1-2
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Figure 8.  JMP 5.1 Small Sample T-Test Results 
Since the t-test p-value of 0.1181 is greater than the established alpha of 0.05, 
there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  Therefore, the t-test results 
provide statistical support that the pre-reform and post-reform samples represent two 
populations with equal annual ACGF means.  Further analysis of the JMP 5.1 small 
sample t-test output reveals a 95 percent confidence interval that the true difference 
between the population means falls within the lower bound range of -.03079 and upper 
bound range of .21645.  Since this range includes zero, there is a 95 percent probability 
that the two populations actually have the same mean. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the statistical analysis for each phase of the 
research.  Initially, the Phase I annual ACGFs for each aircraft weapon system were 
identified for years 1991 to 2001. The treatment period aircraft weapon system ACGF 
average of 40 percent was calculated and shown to be 12 percentage points higher than 
the 30 year historical average of 28 percent reported by RAND. 
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Next, a Phase II hypothesis test was chosen to determine if the mean ACGF for 
pre-reform (1 January 1991 to 31 December 1996) aircraft weapon systems was equal to 
the mean ACGF for post-reform (1 January 1997 to 31 December 2001) aircraft weapon 
systems.  The parametric small sample t-test was chosen as the hypothesis test after the 
Shapiro-Wilks test for normality indicated that the sample distributions were normal and 
the F-test revealed equality of variance.  Finally, the Phase II small sample t-test 
hypothesis results were presented, identifying no significant statistical disparity between 
the means of each reform period. 
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V.  Conclusion 
Review of Research Objectives 
This research focused on two main objectives.  First, using a hybrid adjusted cost 
growth model determine if aircraft weapon systems incurred cost growth from 1991 to 
2001 at a similar rate to aircraft weapon systems cost growth identified in the previous 30 
years by RAND.  Second, by means of hypothesis testing, identify if any significant 
statistical indications reveal if acquisition reform initiatives implemented during the 
research window made any impact on aircraft weapon systems cost growth.   
Discussion of Results 
The Phase I adjusted cost growth factor (ACGF) results revealed that from 1991 
to 2001 aircraft weapon systems have on average exceeded the 28 percent historical 
ACGF identified by RAND.  This result is apparent when comparing the mean annual 
ACGF for the entire treatment period of 40 percent from Table 14 to the 28 percent 
historical ACGF previously calculated by RAND.  Additionally, the results identified that 
9 of the 13 (69.23 percent) aircraft weapon systems included in this analysis experienced 
cost growth from 1991 to 2001. 
The Phase II statistical assumptions of independence, random sampling, 
normality, and equality of variance were validated to determine the appropriate 
hypothesis test for this analysis.  While independence and random sampling were 
assumed, the normality and equality of variance assumptions passed the appropriate test, 
identifying the need for a parametric hypothesis test.  The small sample t-test was chosen 
for this analysis because it is the most appropriate statistical test for comparing two 
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populations with independent sampling and small sample sizes.  The small sample t-test 
results provide statistical support, in general, to accept the null hypothesis that the pre-
reform sample and the post-reform sample represent two populations with equal annual 
ACGF means.  Therefore, at the alpha level of .05, we can be 95 percent confident that 
the average annual ACGF in the pre-reform and post-reform periods are the same. 
Conclusions 
The Phase I results identified that from 1991 to 2001 over 69 percent of aircraft 
weapon systems experienced adjusted cost growth, with an overall average of 40 percent; 
well above the historical average of 28 percent previously reported by RAND.  These 
results effectively satisfied the initial research objective of determining if adjusted cost 
growth existed in aircraft weapon systems during the research period and developed the 
ACGFs for the Phase II analysis.  The Phase I analysis revealed several complicating 
factors involved in performing cost growth calculations.  Initially, the data included in 
cost growth calculations are somewhat subjective, as one must carefully interpret the 
Selected Acquisition Report’s (SAR) qualitative and quantitative sections.  Proper data 
extraction from the SAR is perhaps best classified as an art rather than a science, as 
numerous organizations have developed different cost data from the same source 
documents.  Furthermore, there are several different methodologies available to calculate 
cost growth.  Researchers must clearly determine how to adjust for inflation and whether 
or not to account for quantity adjustments, production learning curves or simply compute 
the raw data at face value.  Selecting the appropriate methodology for the research 
objective is crucial in generating accurate results.  Finally, the dynamic nature of using 
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“real world” data poses several statistical limitations as new aircraft weapon systems 
begin and existing systems terminate throughout the research period.  However, statistical 
limitations are common and generally accepted when dealing with “real world” data. 
The results of Phase II raise some concerns about the effectiveness of current 
acquisition reform strategies on weapon system cost growth.  As revealed in Chapter II, 
many of the same reform initiatives re-appear with each attempt by the Department of 
Defense (DoD), Congress, and Presidential Administration to curb cost growth, even 
after historical cost growth studies revealed that cost growth within major defense 
acquisition programs (MDAP) continue to average around 20 percent.  Many of the 
themes that have persisted in both historical and current acquisition reform endeavors 
include: a push to eliminate bureaucracy, streamlining regulatory guidelines, 
implementing commercial practices, providing the end-user more flexibility, and 
organizational culture change.  While the majority of the DoD, Congressional, and 
Presidential Administration’s acquisition reform efforts have targeted some form of 
management inefficiencies, the results of this and previous cost growth studies certainly 
leaves room for debate as to whether this approach is appropriate for reducing cost 
growth. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
During the course of this thesis, three potential areas for follow-on research arose.  
First, analyze recent cost growth for all weapon systems using SAR data.  Results from 
this analysis could be compared with RAND’s historical cost growth results to determine 
if, on a macro level, any improvements have occurred over time.  Additionally, testing for 
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differences in the pre-reform and post-reform population means of all weapon systems 
may reveal that the aircraft weapon system results in this thesis were simply an anomaly 
and acquisition reform initiatives have made cost growth improvements.  Second, 
identify the causes of cost growth at the program level and quantify the most severe cost 
growth drivers.  Due to the dynamic nature of weapon system acquisition, identifying 
cost drivers that universally apply to all programs may not provide a specific program 
manager with much insight.  However, research performed to identify and quantitatively 
rank the most significant program specific cost drivers would reveal where the greatest 
cost growth mitigation efforts should be focused.  Finally, develop a program specific 
cost growth model to facilitate cost growth management in the future.  Numerous 
researchers have designed generic cost growth prediction models applicable to all 
weapon systems; however, designing a cost growth prediction model for a specific 
program may provide more relevant results for the respective program manager.  A more 
specialized cost growth model for a single weapon system should effectively account for 
the nuances of that system and generate a more accurate cost growth forecast.  This 
improvement in cost growth forecasting accuracy would enable a program manager to 
devise a more appropriate scheme for mitigating cost growth. 
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Appendix A.  B1-B (Lancer) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline  
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1982 100 2582.60 17862.30 0.00 20444.90 4391.43 30218.74 0.00 34610.17
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1981 3019.80 17396.10 0.00 20415.90 5134.84 29430.05 0.00 34564.89
1992 1981 3337.40 17617.10 0.00 20954.50 5674.89 29803.92 0.00 35478.81
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1981 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.70 -466.20 -462.50  - 
1992 1981 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.70 -245.20 -241.50  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1981 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.26 -788.70 -782.44  - 
1992 1981 100 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6.26 -414.82 -408.56  - 
SAR     BY       BY T1 Learn CY T1 CY CY CY  -  - 
1991 1981 1383.63 0.74 2340.77 32956.42 32956.42 -782.44  -  - 
1992 1981 1383.63 0.74 2340.77 32956.42 32956.42 -408.56  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC     
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program  
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991  - 0.97 1.00  - 1.17 0.97 #DIV/0! 1.00  - 
1992  - 0.99 1.03 - 1.29 0.99 #DIV/0! 1.02 - 
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
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Appendix B.  C-130J (Hercules) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1996 8 8.90 514.10 0.00 523.00 9.41 542.07 0.00 551.48
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1997 1996 9.40 1100.90 0.00 1110.30 9.94 1160.80 0.00 1170.74
1998 1996 9.40 2615.40 0.00 2624.80 9.94 2757.70 0.00 2767.64
1999 1996 9.40 2394.80 0.00 2404.20 9.94 2525.09 0.00 2535.03
2000 1996 9.40 2394.80 0.00 2404.20 9.94 2525.09 0.00 2535.03
2001 1996 9.40 12612.20 0.00 12621.60 9.94 13298.40 0.00 13308.34
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1997 1996 18 522.80 0.00 522.80 161.90 586.80 424.90  - 
1998 1996 37 1017.10 -14.70 1002.40 1164.30 2101.30 937.00  - 
1999 1996 32 -270.80 -34.90 -305.70 858.60 1880.70 1022.10  - 
2000 1996 32 0.00 0.00 0.00 858.60 1880.70 1022.10  - 
2001 1996 168 9414.10 808.50 10222.60 11081.20 12098.10 1016.90  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1997 1996 18 551.24 0.00 551.24 170.71 618.73 448.02  - 
1998 1996 37 1072.44 -15.50 1056.94 1227.65 2215.63 987.98  - 
1999 1996 32 -285.53 -36.80 -322.33 905.31 1983.02 1077.71  - 
2000 1996 32 0.00 0.00 0.00 905.31 1983.02 1077.71  - 
2001 1996 168 9926.30 852.49 10778.79 11684.10 12756.33 1072.23  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1997 1996 32.59 1.14 34.37 404.40 1057.67 171.30  -  - 
1998 1996 32.59 1.14 34.37 404.40 2485.13 160.77  -  - 
1999 1996 32.59 1.14 34.37 404.40 2092.17 208.31  -  - 
2000 1996 32.59 1.14 34.37 404.40 2092.17 208.31  -  - 
2001 1996 32.59 1.14 34.37 404.40 14941.56 29.02  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1997 - 1.32 1.31 - 1.06 2.14 #DIV/0! 2.12 -
1998 - 1.30 1.29 - 1.06 5.09 #DIV/0! 5.02 -
1999 - 1.38 1.38 - 1.06 4.66 #DIV/0! 4.60 -
2000 - 1.38 1.38 - 1.06 4.66 #DIV/0! 4.60 -
2001 - 1.05 1.05 - 1.06 24.53 #DIV/0! 24.13 -
BY 1996 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
BY 1996 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1996 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
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Appendix C.  C-17 (Globemaster III) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1985 210 2879.80 16684.20 112.50 19676.50 4896.79 28225.68 186.04 33308.51
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1981 3913.30 15084.00 265.20 19262.50 6654.14 25518.52 438.56 32611.23
1992 1981 3925.50 17295.50 192.50 21413.50 6674.89 29259.85 318.34 36253.08
1993 1981 4070.40 8276.30 169.20 12515.90 6921.27 14001.52 279.81 21202.60
1994 1981 4071.40 8305.40 140.20 12517.00 6922.97 14050.75 231.85 21205.58
1995 1996 7617.10 32448.20 328.10 40393.40 8053.61 34213.62 347.42 42614.64
1996 1996 7620.90 32149.40 354.10 40124.40 8057.62 33898.57 374.95 42331.14
1997 1996 7619.90 32511.20 352.30 40483.40 8056.57 34280.05 373.04 42709.66
1998 1996 7763.40 35992.70 357.90 44114.00 8208.29 37950.97 378.97 46538.23
1999 1996 7840.60 36055.20 364.10 44259.90 8289.91 38016.87 385.54 46692.32
2000 1996 7840.60 36055.20 364.10 44259.90 8289.91 38016.87 385.54 46692.32
2001 1996 8233.80 47167.40 750.70 56151.90 8705.65 49733.66 794.90 59234.20
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1981 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6037.00 -1600.20 4436.80  - 
1992 1981 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 -6037.00 611.30 6648.30  - 
1993 1981 40 -5576.80 -3617.40 -9194.20 -15231.20 -8407.90 6823.30  - 
1994 1981 40 0.00 268.20 268.20 -14963.00 -8378.80 6584.20  - 
1995 1996 120 10415.50 6273.60 16689.10 1726.10 15764.00 14037.90  - 
1996 1996 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 1726.10 15465.20 13739.10  - 
1997 1996 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 1726.10 15827.00 14100.90  - 
1998 1996 134 1567.60 1265.90 2833.50 4559.60 19308.50 14748.90  - 
1999 1996 134 0.00 0.00 0.00 4559.60 19371.00 14811.40  - 
2000 1996 134 0.00 0.00 0.00 4559.60 19371.00 14811.40  - 
2001 1996 180 4848.20 6849.70 11697.90 16257.50 30483.20 14225.70  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1981 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10213.16 -2707.16 7506.01  - 
1992 1981 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 -10213.16 1034.17 11247.34  - 
1993 1981 40 -9434.61 -6119.78 -15554.39 -25767.55 -14224.16 11543.39  - 
1994 1981 40 0.00 453.73 453.73 -25313.82 -14174.93 11138.89  - 
1995 1996 120 17620.54 10613.43 28233.97 2920.15 26668.92 23748.77  - 
1996 1996 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 2920.15 26163.42 23243.28  - 
1997 1996 120 0.00 0.00 0.00 2920.15 26775.50 23855.35  - 
1998 1996 134 2652.00 2141.60 4793.61 7713.75 32665.37 24951.62  - 
1999 1996 134 0.00 0.00 0.00 7713.75 32771.10 25057.35  - 
2000 1996 134 0.00 0.00 0.00 7713.75 32771.10 25057.35  - 
2001 1996 180 8202.00 11588.06 19790.05 27503.81 51570.29 24066.49 - 
BY 1981 & 1996  Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1981 & 1996 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
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SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1981 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 36837.18 12191.13  -  - 
1992 1981 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 36837.18 18267.73  -  - 
1993 1981 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 14216.00 48582.25  -  - 
1994 1981 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 14216.00 46879.84  -  - 
1995 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 36837.18 38572.36  -  - 
1996 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 36837.18 37751.34  -  - 
1997 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 36837.18 38745.47  -  - 
1998 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 40534.10 36829.81  -  - 
1999 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 40534.10 36985.88  -  - 
2000 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 40534.10 36985.88  -  - 
2001 1996 551.19 0.91 581.18 59830.32 52348.02 27506.40  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC     
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991 - 1.43 1.43 - 1.36 0.90 2.36 0.98 -
1992 - 1.65 1.61 - 1.36 1.04 1.71 1.09 -
1993 - 2.72 2.52 - 1.41 0.50 1.50 0.64 -
1994 - 2.66 2.47 - 1.41 0.50 1.25 0.64 -
1995 - 2.37 2.26 - 1.64 1.21 1.87 2.05 -
1996 - 2.34 2.23 - 1.65 1.20 2.02 2.04 -
1997 - 2.37 2.26 - 1.65 1.21 2.01 2.06 -
1998 - 2.30 2.21 - 1.68 1.34 2.04 2.24 -
1999 - 2.31 2.22 - 1.69 1.35 2.07 2.25 -
2000 - 2.31 2.22 - 1.69 1.35 2.07 2.25 -
2001 - 1.97 1.96 - 1.78 1.76 4.27 2.85 -
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix D.  KC-135R (Stratotanker) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1982 334 88.30 4941.80 0.00 5030.10 150.14 8360.35 0.00 8510.49
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1981 89.70 4498.50 0.00 4588.20 152.53 7610.39 0.00 7762.91
1992 1981 89.70 4416.10 0.00 4505.80 152.53 7470.99 0.00 7623.51
1993 1981 89.70 4535.60 0.00 4625.30 152.53 7673.15 0.00 7825.68
1994 1981 89.70 4596.30 0.00 4686.00 152.53 7775.84 0.00 7928.37
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1981 397 -1778.40 -368.00 -2146.40 619.50 -443.30 -1062.80  - 
1992 1981 390 -114.00 1.30 -112.70 506.80 -525.70 -1032.50  - 
1993 1981 400 116.30 3.50 119.80 626.60 -406.20 -1032.80  - 
1994 1981 406 69.60 -2.70 66.90 693.50 -345.50 -1039.00  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1981 397 -3008.63 -622.57 -3631.20 1048.05 -749.96 -1798.00  - 
1992 1981 390 -192.86 2.20 -190.66 857.38 -889.36 -1746.74  - 
1993 1981 400 196.75 5.92 202.67 1060.06 -687.19 -1747.25  - 
1994 1981 406 117.75 -4.57 113.18 1173.24 -584.50 -1757.74  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1981 75.31 0.79 127.41 6051.60 6787.75 -1603.00  -  - 
1992 1981 75.31 0.79 127.41 6051.60 6708.00 -1575.82  -  - 
1993 1981 75.31 0.79 127.41 6051.60 6821.79 -1549.98  -  - 
1994 1981 75.31 0.79 127.41 6051.60 6889.60 -1543.94  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991 - 0.81 0.81 - 1.02 0.91 #DIV/0! 0.91 -
1992 - 0.81 0.82 - 1.02 0.89 #DIV/0! 0.90 -
1993 - 0.81 0.82 - 1.02 0.92 #DIV/0! 0.92 -
1994 - 0.82 0.82 - 1.02 0.93 #DIV/0! 0.93 -
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1981 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
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Appendix E.  AV-8B (Harrier) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1981 336 882.00 4912.00 1.80 5795.80 1801.10 9991.86 3.42 11796.38
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1979 1127.60 3783.90 5.50 4917.00 2302.63 7697.11 10.44 10010.18
1992 1979 1155.30 3813.00 5.50 4973.80 2359.20 7756.31 10.44 10125.94
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1979 279 36.30 2.20 38.50 -461.20 -1128.10 -666.90  - 
1992 1979 279 0.00 0.00 0.00 -461.20 -1099.00 -637.80  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1979 279 73.84 4.48 78.32 -938.16 -2294.75 -1356.59  - 
1992 1979 279 0.00 0.00 0.00 -938.16 -2235.56 -1297.40  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1979 96.85 0.78 197.01 8359.24 7415.68 -1529.20  -  - 
1992 1979 96.85 0.78 197.01 8359.24 7415.68 -1462.48  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991 - 0.85 0.91 - 1.28 0.77 3.06 0.85 -
1992 - 0.85 0.92 - 1.31 0.78 3.06 0.86 -
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances 
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
BY 1979 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1979 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1979 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
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Appendix F.  AV-8B (Remanufacture) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1994 72 0.00 1920.90 0.00 1920.90 0.00 2089.30 0.00 2089.30
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1995 1994 0.00 2041.00 0.00 2041.00 0.00 2219.93 0.00 2219.93
1996 1994 0.00 1959.50 0.00 1959.50 0.00 2131.28 0.00 2131.28
1997 1994 0.00 1888.40 0.00 1888.40 0.00 2053.95 0.00 2053.95
1998 1994 0.00 1949.30 0.00 1949.30 0.00 2120.19 0.00 2120.19
1999 1994 0.00 1961.30 0.00 1961.30 0.00 2133.24 0.00 2133.24
2000 1994 0.00 1957.20 0.00 1957.20 0.00 2128.78 0.00 2128.78
2001 1994 0.00 1991.60 0.00 1991.60 0.00 2166.20 0.00 2166.20
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1995 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.50 120.10 148.60  - 
1996 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.50 38.60 67.10  - 
1997 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.50 -32.50 -4.00  - 
1998 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.50 28.40 56.90  - 
1999 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.50 40.40 68.90  - 
2000 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -28.50 36.30 64.80  - 
2001 1994 74 37.10 -2.20 34.90 6.40 70.70 64.30  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1995 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -31.00 130.63 161.63  - 
1996 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -31.00 41.98 72.98  - 
1997 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -31.00 -35.35 -4.35  - 
1998 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -31.00 30.89 61.89  - 
1999 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -31.00 43.94 74.94  - 
2000 1994 72 0.00 0.00 0.00 -31.00 39.48 70.48  - 
2001 1994 74 40.35 -2.39 37.96 6.96 76.90 69.94 - 
BY 1994 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1994 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1994 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
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SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1995 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2151.68 161.63  -  - 
1996 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2151.68 72.98  -  - 
1997 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2151.68 -4.35  -  - 
1998 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2151.68 61.89  -  - 
1999 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2151.68 74.94  -  - 
2000 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2151.68 70.48  -  - 
2001 1994 39.94 0.94 43.44 2151.68 2206.16 68.21  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1995  - 1.08 1.08  - #DIV/0! 1.06 #DIV/0! 1.06  - 
1996  - 1.03 1.03  - #DIV/0! 1.02 #DIV/0! 1.02  - 
1997  - 1.00 1.00  - #DIV/0! 0.98 #DIV/0! 0.98  - 
1998  - 1.03 1.03  - #DIV/0! 1.01 #DIV/0! 1.01  - 
1999  - 1.04 1.04  - #DIV/0! 1.02 #DIV/0! 1.02  - 
2000  - 1.03 1.03  - #DIV/0! 1.02 #DIV/0! 1.02  - 
2001  - 1.03 1.03 - #DIV/0! 1.04 #DIV/0! 1.04 - 
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix G.  F-14D (Tomcat) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1986 527 1696.50 16152.50 11.80 17860.80 2393.82 22138.84 16.57 24549.23
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1989 1836.50 4308.70 15.50 6160.70 2320.57 5297.15 19.30 7637.02
1992 1989 1887.40 4294.00 12.20 6193.60 2384.89 5279.08 15.19 7679.15
1993 1989 1827.00 4268.00 12.20 6107.20 2308.57 5247.11 15.19 7570.87
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1989 55 401.80 860.50 1262.30 -12685.60 -11843.80 841.80  - 
1992 1989 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -12685.60 -11858.50 827.10  - 
1993 1989 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -12685.60 -11884.50 801.10  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1989 55 493.98 1057.91 1551.88 -15595.77 -14560.86 1034.92  - 
1992 1989 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -15595.77 -14578.93 1016.84  - 
1993 1989 55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -15595.77 -14610.89 984.88  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1989 143.84 0.89 176.84 31829.87 4893.47 6731.67  -  - 
1992 1989 143.84 0.89 176.84 31829.87 4893.47 6614.11  -  - 
1993 1989 143.84 0.89 176.84 31829.87 4893.47 6406.20  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991  - 1.30 1.27  - 0.97 0.24 1.16 0.34  - 
1992  - 1.30 1.27  - 1.00 0.24 0.92 0.35  - 
1993  - 1.29 1.26 - 0.96 0.24 0.92 0.34 - 
BY 1989 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1989 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1989 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix H.  F-16 (Fighting Falcon) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1975 650 578.60 3798.20 0.00 4376.80 1657.88 11148.22 0.00 12806.10
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1975 1395.40 14401.10 0.00 15796.50 3998.28 42269.15 0.00 46267.43
1992 1975 1143.90 15063.60 0.00 16207.50 3277.65 44213.68 0.00 47491.33
1993 1975 1242.40 14603.30 0.00 15845.70 3559.89 42862.64 0.00 46422.52
1994 1975 1453.60 14568.50 0.00 16022.10 4165.04 42760.49 0.00 46925.54
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1975 2189 143.10 174.60 317.70 317.70 10602.90 10285.20  - 
1992 1975 2237 0.00 0.00 0.00 317.70 11265.40 10947.70  - 
1993 1975 2201 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10805.10 10805.10  - 
1994 1975 2201 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10770.30 10770.30  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1975 2189 420.02 512.47 932.49 932.49 31120.93 30188.44  - 
1992 1975 2237 0.00 0.00 0.00 932.49 33065.45 32132.96  - 
1993 1975 2201 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31714.41 31714.41  - 
1994 1975 2201 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 31612.27 31612.27  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1975 13.86 0.93 40.69 13559.06 40286.36 10160.44  -  - 
1992 1975 13.86 0.93 40.69 13559.06 41077.72 10606.55  -  - 
1993 1975 13.86 0.93 40.69 13559.06 40484.36 10621.82  -  - 
1994 1975 13.86 0.93 40.69 13559.06 40484.36 10587.61  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991  - 1.91 1.98  - 2.41 3.79 #DIV/0! 3.61  - 
1992  - 1.95 1.95  - 1.98 3.97 #DIV/0! 3.70  - 
1993  - 1.95 1.98  - 2.15 3.84 #DIV/0! 3.62  - 
1994  - 1.95 2.02 - 2.51 3.84 #DIV/0! 3.66 - 
BY 1975 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1975 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1975 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix I.  F-22 (Raptor) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1991 648 16833.90 43980.60 200.00 61014.50 20464.26 52270.74 240.27 72975.27
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1992 1990 16481.90 44106.10 120.40 60708.40 20036.35 52419.90 144.64 72600.89
1993 1990 16388.90 32565.80 119.60 49074.30 19923.29 38704.30 143.68 58771.28
1994 1990 16896.70 32564.50 121.00 49582.20 20540.60 38702.76 145.36 59388.72
1995 1990 18488.50 32696.10 136.00 51320.60 22475.69 38859.16 163.38 61498.23
1996 1990 19391.10 31640.90 139.10 51171.10 23572.94 37605.06 167.11 61345.11
1997 1990 19714.90 28286.10 137.80 48138.80 23966.57 33617.90 165.55 57750.01
1998 1990 19907.60 28344.40 157.90 48409.90 24200.83 33687.19 189.69 58077.71
1999 1990 20973.60 27137.70 196.60 48307.90 25496.72 32253.03 236.18 57985.93
2000 1990 20973.60 27137.70 196.60 48307.90 25496.72 32253.03 236.18 57985.93
2001 1990 22495.10 31277.70 356.40 54129.20 27346.34 37173.40 428.16 64947.90
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1992 1990 648 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 125.50 125.50  - 
1993 1990 442 -9891.20 -1742.70 -11633.90 -11633.90 -11414.80 219.10  - 
1994 1990 442 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11633.90 -11416.10 217.80  - 
1995 1990 438 -190.00 0.00 -190.00 -11823.90 -11284.50 539.40  - 
1996 1990 438 0.00 -178.00 -178.00 -12001.90 -12339.70 -337.80  - 
1997 1990 339 -5143.40 825.40 -4318.00 -16319.90 -15694.50 625.40  - 
1998 1990 339 0.00 0.00 0.00 -16319.90 -15636.20 683.70  - 
1999 1990 333 -1089.90 0.00 -1089.90 -17409.80 -16842.90 566.90  - 
2000 1990 333 0.00 0.00 0.00 -17409.80 -16842.90 566.90  - 
2001 1990 333 220.90 5.90 226.80 -17183.00 -12702.90 4480.10  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1992 1990 648 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 149.16 149.16  - 
1993 1990 442 -11755.65 -2071.19 -13826.84 -13826.84 -13566.44 260.40  - 
1994 1990 442 0.00 0.00 0.00 -13826.84 -13567.98 258.85  - 
1995 1990 438 -225.81 0.00 -225.81 -14052.65 -13411.58 641.07  - 
1996 1990 438 0.00 -211.55 -211.55 -14264.20 -14665.68 -401.47  - 
1997 1990 339 -6112.91 980.98 -5131.92 -19396.13 -18652.84 743.29  - 
1998 1990 339 0.00 0.00 0.00 -19396.13 -18583.55 812.57  - 
1999 1990 333 -1295.34 0.00 -1295.34 -20691.47 -20017.71 673.76  - 
2000 1990 333 0.00 0.00 0.00 -20691.47 -20017.71 673.76  - 
2001 1990 333 262.54 7.01 269.55 -20421.92 -15097.34 5324.58 - 
BY 1990 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1990 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1990 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
 
   
 84
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1992 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 65822.16 149.16  -  - 
1993 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 49645.63 345.25  -  - 
1994 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 49645.63 343.20  -  - 
1995 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 49314.01 855.68  -  - 
1996 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 49314.01 -535.87  -  - 
1997 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 40825.98 1198.37  -  - 
1998 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 40825.98 1310.08  -  - 
1999 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 40292.03 1100.67  -  - 
2000 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 40292.03 1100.67  -  - 
2001 1990 468.41 0.83 556.70 65822.16 40292.03 8698.38  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1992  - 1.00 0.99  - 0.98 1.00 0.60 0.99  - 
1993  - 1.01 1.00  - 0.97 0.74 0.60 0.80  - 
1994  - 1.01 1.00  - 1.00 0.74 0.61 0.81  - 
1995  - 1.02 1.04  - 1.10 0.74 0.68 0.84  - 
1996  - 0.99 1.03  - 1.15 0.72 0.70 0.84  - 
1997  - 1.02 1.06  - 1.17 0.64 0.69 0.79  - 
1998  - 1.03 1.07  - 1.18 0.64 0.79 0.79  - 
1999  - 1.02 1.08  - 1.25 0.62 0.98 0.79  - 
2000  - 1.02 1.08  - 1.25 0.62 0.98 0.79  - 
2001  - 1.17 1.22 - 1.34 0.71 1.78 0.89 - 
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix J.  FA-18 E/F (Super Hornet) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1992 1000 4927.40 48771.50 0.00 53698.90 5990.03 57964.70 0.00 63954.7
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1993 1990 4927.40 48931.40 0.00 53858.80 5990.03 58154.74 0.00 64144.77
1994 1990 4867.80 49320.00 0.00 54187.80 5917.58 58616.59 0.00 64534.17
1995 1990 4672.60 50015.00 0.00 54687.60 5680.28 59442.60 0.00 65122.88
1996 1990 4754.40 47546.80 0.00 52301.20 5779.72 56509.15 0.00 62288.87
1997 1990 4871.20 29422.10 0.00 34293.30 5921.71 34968.03 0.00 40889.74
1998 1990 4853.20 30771.50 0.00 35624.70 5899.83 36571.79 0.00 42471.61
1999 1990 4833.60 30991.20 0.00 35824.80 5876.00 36832.90 0.00 42708.90
2000 2000 5889.40 37600.20 0.00 43489.60 5889.40 37600.20 0.00 43489.60
2001 2000 5894.80 39394.90 0.00 45289.70 5894.80 39394.90 0.00 45289.70
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1993 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 159.90 159.90  - 
1994 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 548.50 548.50  - 
1995 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1243.50 1243.50  - 
1996 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1224.70 -1224.70  - 
1997 1990 548 -14908.10 -2642.80 -17550.90 -17550.90 -19349.40 -1798.50  - 
1998 1990 548 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -18000.00 -18000.00  - 
1999 1990 548 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -17780.30 -17780.30  - 
2000 2000 548 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11171.30 -11171.30  - 
2001 2000 548 54.90 21.60 76.50 76.50 -9376.60 -9453.10  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1993 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 190.04 190.04  - 
1994 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 651.89 651.89  - 
1995 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1477.89 1477.89  - 
1996 1990 1000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1455.55 -1455.55  - 
1997 1990 548 -17718.21 -3140.96 -20859.16 -20859.16 -22996.67 -2137.51  - 
1998 1990 548 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -21392.92 -21392.92  - 
1999 1990 548 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -21131.80 -21131.80  - 
2000 2000 548 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11171.30 -11171.30  - 
2001 2000 548 54.90 21.60 76.50 76.50 -9376.60 -9453.10 - 
BY 1990 & 2000 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1990 & 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1990 & 2000 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
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SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1993 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 58599.85 190.04  -  - 
1994 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 58599.85 651.89  -  - 
1995 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 58599.85 1477.89  -  - 
1996 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 58599.85 -1455.55  -  - 
1997 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 37580.76 -3333.03  -  - 
1998 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 37580.76 -33358.07  -  - 
1999 1990 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 37580.76 -32950.92  -  - 
2000 2000 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 37580.76 -17419.46  -  - 
2001 2000 356.58 0.83 356.58 58599.85 37580.76 -14740.26  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC     
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1993  - 1.00 1.00  - 1.00 1.00 #DIV/0! 1.00  - 
1994  - 1.01 1.01  - 0.99 1.01 #DIV/0! 1.01  - 
1995  - 1.03 1.02  - 0.95 1.03 #DIV/0! 1.02  - 
1996  - 0.97 0.97  - 0.96 0.97 #DIV/0! 0.97  - 
1997  - 0.94 0.95  - 0.99 0.60 #DIV/0! 0.64  - 
1998  - 0.42 0.48  - 0.98 0.63 #DIV/0! 0.66  - 
1999  - 0.43 0.48  - 0.98 0.64 #DIV/0! 0.67  - 
2000  - 0.70 0.73  - 0.98 0.65 #DIV/0! 0.81  - 
2001  - 0.75 0.77 - 0.98 0.68 #DIV/0! 0.84 - 
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix K.  FA-18 (Hornet) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1976 800 1526.60 6523.10 18.00 8067.70 4374.21 19146.17 47.39 23567.78
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1975 1720.00 13542.30 21.10 15283.40 4928.37 39748.46 55.56 44732.38
1992 1975 1948.60 12761.20 23.70 14733.50 5583.38 37455.83 62.40 43101.61
1993 1975 1938.60 12543.50 21.40 14503.50 5554.73 36816.85 56.35 42427.92
1994 1975 1960.60 11984.40 21.40 13966.40 5617.77 35175.81 56.35 40849.92
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1975 1157 0.00 0.00 0.00 1848.50 7019.20 5170.70  - 
1992 1975 1075 -362.60 -319.50 -682.10 1166.40 6238.10 5071.70  - 
1993 1975 1051 -117.80 -109.20 -227.00 939.40 6020.40 5081.00  - 
1994 1975 1015 -170.80 -125.10 -295.90 643.50 5461.30 4817.80  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1975 1157 0.00 0.00 0.00 5425.59 20602.29 15176.70  - 
1992 1975 1075 -1064.28 -937.78 -2002.05 3423.54 18309.66 14886.12  - 
1993 1975 1051 -345.76 -320.52 -666.28 2757.26 17670.68 14913.41  - 
1994 1975 1015 -501.32 -367.19 -868.51 1888.76 16029.64 14140.89  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1975 71.76 0.83 210.62 28105.98 36822.23 11584.20  -  - 
1992 1975 71.76 0.83 210.62 28105.98 34893.01 11990.62  -  - 
1993 1975 71.76 0.83 210.62 28105.98 34320.99 12212.82  -  - 
1994 1975 71.76 0.83 210.62 28105.98 33456.35 11879.47  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991  - 1.61 1.52  - 1.13 2.08 1.17 1.89  - 
1992  - 1.63 1.56  - 1.28 1.96 1.32 1.83  - 
1993  - 1.64 1.57  - 1.27 1.92 1.19 1.80  - 
1994  - 1.62 1.56 - 1.28 1.84 1.19 1.73 - 
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
BY 1975 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1975 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
BY 1975 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
 
   
 88
Appendix L.  T-6A (JPATS) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1995 711 293.50 2276.00 62.50 2632.00 344.20 2629.69 72.88 3046.77
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1996 1995 320.80 2501.20 37.20 2859.20 345.54 2675.65 40.09 3061.29
1997 1995 263.50 2931.90 34.00 3229.40 283.82 3136.39 36.65 3456.86
1998 1995 263.80 2951.30 35.40 3250.50 284.14 3157.15 38.15 3479.45
1999 1995 257.50 3058.40 35.90 3351.80 277.36 3271.72 38.69 3587.77
2000 1995 257.50 3058.40 35.90 3351.80 277.36 3271.72 38.69 3587.77
2001 2002 289.80 4244.70 62.80 4597.30 279.41 4098.78 60.36 4438.55
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1996 1995 711 0.00 0.00 0.00 2261.30 225.20 -2036.10  - 
1997 1995 711 0.00 0.00 0.00 2261.30 655.90 -1605.40  - 
1998 1995 711 0.00 0.00 0.00 2261.30 675.30 -1586.00  - 
1999 1995 711 0.00 0.00 0.00 2261.30 782.40 -1478.90  - 
2000 1995 711 0.00 0.00 0.00 2261.30 782.40 -1478.90  - 
2001 2002 782 347.90 0.00 347.90 2609.20 1968.70 -640.50  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1996 1995 711 0.00 0.00 2419.02 240.91 -2178.11 0.00  - 
1997 1995 711 0.00 0.00 2419.02 701.65 -1717.37 0.00  - 
1998 1995 711 0.00 0.00 2419.02 722.40 -1696.62 0.00  - 
1999 1995 711 0.00 0.00 2419.02 836.97 -1582.05 0.00  - 
2000 1995 711 0.00 0.00 2419.02 836.97 -1582.05 0.00  - 
2001 2002 782 335.94 0.00 335.94 2519.51 1901.02 -618.48  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1996 1995 17.33 0.87 16.74 3026.20 3026.20 0.00  -  - 
1997 1995 17.33 0.87 16.74 3026.20 3026.20 0.00  -  - 
1998 1995 17.33 0.87 16.74 3026.20 3026.20 0.00  -  - 
1999 1995 17.33 0.87 16.74 3026.20 3026.20 0.00  -  - 
2000 1995 17.33 0.87 16.74 3026.20 3026.20 0.00  -  - 
2001 2002 17.33 0.87 16.74 3026.20 3262.99 -573.60  - - 
BY 1995 & 2002 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
BY 1995 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1995 & 2002 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
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SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1996  - 1.00 0.99  - 1.00 1.02 0.55 1.09  - 
1997  - 1.00 0.97  - 0.82 1.19 0.50 1.23  - 
1998  - 1.00 0.97  - 0.83 1.20 0.52 1.23  - 
1999  - 1.00 0.97  - 0.81 1.24 0.53 1.27  - 
2000  - 1.00 0.97  - 0.81 1.24 0.53 1.27  - 
2001  - 0.78 0.79 - 0.81 1.56 0.83 1.75 - 
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix M.  T-45-TS (Goshawk) ACGF Calculations 
 
MSII 
Baseline 
Year
MSII   
Baseline   
Qty
MSII BY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Baseline 
Total 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
PROC 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Baseline 
Total 
1984 300 491.40 2590.80 0.00 3082.20 733.32 3770.08 0.00 4503.40
SAR     
YEAR
BY      
Dollars
MSII BY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII BY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII BY 
Current 
MILCON 
MSII BY 
Current 
Total 
MSII CY 
Current 
RDTE 
MSII CY 
Current 
PROC 
MSII CY  
Current 
MILCON 
MSII CY 
Current 
Total 
1991 1984 605.90 3867.40 24.20 4497.50 904.19 5627.76 36.08 6568.04
1992 1984 635.80 3887.90 24.20 4547.90 948.81 5657.60 36.08 6642.49
1993 1984 641.80 3461.50 24.10 4127.40 957.77 5037.11 35.93 6030.81
1994 1995 874.20 4565.20 34.00 5473.40 941.62 4883.61 36.65 5861.88
1995 1995 867.80 4531.30 33.90 5433.00 934.73 4847.35 36.54 5818.61
1996 1995 1054.90 4832.20 33.90 5921.00 1136.26 5169.23 36.54 6342.03
1997 1995 1054.60 4565.70 33.90 5654.20 1135.93 4884.15 36.54 6056.62
1998 1995 1054.60 5707.90 33.90 6796.40 1135.93 6106.01 36.54 7278.48
1999 1995 1054.60 4334.70 33.90 5423.20 1135.93 4637.03 36.54 5809.51
2000 1995 1054.60 4334.70 33.90 5423.20 1135.93 4637.03 36.54 5809.51
2001 1995 1054.60 4615.70 33.90 5704.20 1135.93 4937.63 36.54 6110.10
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
BY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
BY Qty 
Var
Total BY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
BY Var
 - 
1991 1984 268 -169.00 -45.50 -214.50 -214.50 1276.60 1491.10  - 
1992 1984 268 0.00 0.00 0.00 -214.50 1297.10 1511.60  - 
1993 1984 218 -305.50 -224.70 -530.20 -744.70 870.70 1615.40  - 
1994 1995 174 -366.50 -192.10 -558.60 -1303.30 1974.40 3277.70  - 
1995 1995 174 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1303.30 1940.50 3243.80  - 
1996 1995 187 216.10 1.10 217.20 -1086.10 2241.40 3327.50  - 
1997 1995 187 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1086.10 1974.90 3061.00  - 
1998 1995 234 772.30 134.70 907.00 -179.10 3117.10 3296.20  - 
1999 1995 169 -1071.80 -274.00 -1345.80 -1524.90 1743.90 3268.80  - 
2000 1995 169 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1524.90 1743.90 3268.80  - 
2001 1995 181 201.00 20.70 221.70 -1303.20 2024.90 3328.10  - 
SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars
Current 
PROC 
Qty
Primary 
CY Qty 
Var
Secondary 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
Qty Var
Cum Total 
CY Qty 
Var
Total CY 
PROC 
Var
Residual 
CY Var
 - 
1991 1984 268 -245.93 -66.21 -312.14 -312.14 1857.68 2169.82  - 
1992 1984 268 0.00 0.00 0.00 -312.14 1887.51 2199.65  - 
1993 1984 218 -444.56 -326.98 -771.54 -1083.67 1267.03 2350.70  - 
1994 1995 174 -392.06 -205.50 -597.56 -1394.20 2112.11 3506.31  - 
1995 1995 174 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1394.20 2075.85 3470.05  - 
1996 1995 187 231.17 1.18 232.35 -1161.85 2397.73 3559.58  - 
1997 1995 187 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1161.85 2112.64 3274.50  - 
1998 1995 234 826.17 144.09 970.26 -191.59 3334.51 3526.10  - 
1999 1995 169 -1146.56 -293.11 -1439.67 -1631.26 1865.53 3496.79  - 
2000 1995 169 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1631.26 1865.53 3496.79  - 
2001 1995 181 215.02 22.14 237.16 -1394.09 2166.13 3560.23 - 
BY 1984 & 1985 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1984 Dollars In Millions CY 2000 Dollars In Millions
BY 1984 & 1985 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
CY 2000 Dollars In Millions Qty Adjustment Data
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SAR     
YEAR
BY       
Dollars BY T1
Learn 
Curve CY T1
CY 
Theoretic 
Baseline
CY 
Theoretic 
Current
CY 
Calculated 
Qty Var
 -  - 
1991 1984 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 6711.20 2376.31  -  - 
1992 1984 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 6711.20 2408.98  -  - 
1993 1984 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 5682.33 3040.53  -  - 
1994 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 4738.28 5438.87  -  - 
1995 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 4738.28 5382.61  -  - 
1996 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 5021.58 5210.01  -  - 
1997 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 5021.58 4792.73  -  - 
1998 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 6016.11 4307.82  -  - 
1999 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 4628.24 5553.06  -  - 
2000 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 4628.24 5553.06  -  - 
2001 1995 69.28 0.87 74.12 7349.86 4891.32 5349.72  -  - 
SAR     
YEAR
 - PROC 
ACGF
Total 
Program 
ACGF
 - RDTE     
UN-ACGF 
PROC    
UN-ACGF
MILCON  
UN-ACGF
Total 
Program   
UN-ACGF
 - 
1991  - 1.63 1.57  - 1.23 1.49 #DIV/0! 1.46  - 
1992  - 1.64 1.59  - 1.29 1.50 #DIV/0! 1.48  - 
1993  - 1.81 1.73  - 1.31 1.34 #DIV/0! 1.34  - 
1994  - 2.44 2.26  - 1.28 1.30 #DIV/0! 1.78  - 
1995  - 2.43 2.25  - 1.27 1.29 #DIV/0! 1.76  - 
1996  - 2.38 2.25  - 1.55 1.37 #DIV/0! 1.92  - 
1997  - 2.27 2.16  - 1.55 1.30 #DIV/0! 1.83  - 
1998  - 2.14 2.05  - 1.55 1.62 #DIV/0! 2.21  - 
1999  - 2.47 2.33  - 1.55 1.23 #DIV/0! 1.76  - 
2000  - 2.47 2.33  - 1.55 1.23 #DIV/0! 1.76  - 
2001  - 2.42 2.29 - 1.55 1.31 #DIV/0! 1.85 - 
Leaning Curve Analysis Applied To Qty Variances
Adjusted CGFs Unadjusted CGFs
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Appendix N.  Learning Curve Calculations 
 
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 1 1319.10 1319.10 0.00 7.18 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 8 4360.70 545.09 2.08 6.30 -0.42 7.18 1319.10 0.74
3 18 8736.70 485.37 2.89 6.18 -0.36 7.16 1281.51 0.78
4 52 13864.40 266.62 3.95 5.59 -0.39 7.19 1319.62 0.76
5 100 17203.20 172.03 4.61 5.15 -0.43 7.23 1383.63 0.74
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 2 66.70 33.35 0.69 3.51 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 7 312.80 44.69 1.95 3.80 0.23 3.35 28.37 1.18
3 16 793.90 49.62 2.77 3.90 0.19 3.39 29.55 1.14
4 23 1223.00 53.17 3.14 3.97 0.19 3.39 29.79 1.14
5 28 1710.90 61.10 3.33 4.11 0.21 3.37 29.02 1.15
6 29 1849.70 63.78 3.37 4.16 0.22 3.35 28.45 1.17
7 31 2144.20 69.17 3.43 4.24 0.24 3.32 27.76 1.18
8 36 2268.10 63.00 3.58 4.14 0.23 3.33 27.92 1.18
9 38 2613.40 68.77 3.64 4.23 0.24 3.32 27.66 1.18
10 42 3101.40 73.84 3.74 4.30 0.25 3.30 27.22 1.19
11 48 3697.00 77.02 3.87 4.34 0.25 3.29 26.79 1.19
12 57 4632.50 81.27 4.04 4.40 0.26 3.27 26.36 1.20
13 69 5511.50 79.88 4.23 4.38 0.26 3.27 26.37 1.20
14 81 6358.40 78.50 4.39 4.36 0.26 3.29 26.72 1.19
15 93 7208.50 77.51 4.53 4.35 0.25 3.31 27.30 1.19
16 105 8050.90 76.68 4.65 4.34 0.24 3.33 28.01 1.18
17 117 8896.00 76.03 4.76 4.33 0.23 3.36 28.79 1.17
18 129 9743.40 75.53 4.86 4.32 0.22 3.39 29.60 1.16
19 141 10604.20 75.21 4.95 4.32 0.21 3.41 30.41 1.16
20 153 11447.00 74.82 5.03 4.32 0.20 3.44 31.20 1.15
21 165 12292.50 74.50 5.11 4.31 0.19 3.47 31.98 1.14
22 168 12612.20 75.07 5.12 4.32 0.19 3.48 32.59 1.14
B1-B (Lancer) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1981 Dollars In Millions
C130-J (Hercules) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1996 Dollars In Millions
 
   
 93
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 2 922.90 461.45 0.69 6.13 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 6 2252.20 375.37 1.79 5.93 -0.19 6.26 525.65 0.88
3 10 3894.20 389.42 2.30 5.96 -0.12 6.20 491.87 0.92
4 14 5994.60 428.19 2.64 6.06 -0.06 6.13 457.17 0.96
5 20 7981.30 399.07 3.00 5.99 -0.05 6.11 451.65 0.97
6 26 10157.50 390.67 3.26 5.97 -0.05 6.11 450.43 0.97
7 32 12517.20 391.16 3.47 5.97 -0.04 6.11 448.32 0.97
8 40 15009.20 375.23 3.69 5.93 -0.05 6.11 451.10 0.97
9 48 17003.90 354.25 3.87 5.87 -0.05 6.13 458.74 0.96
10 57 19157.10 336.09 4.04 5.82 -0.07 6.15 468.89 0.96
11 70 21932.90 313.33 4.25 5.75 -0.08 6.18 482.85 0.95
12 85 25064.80 294.88 4.44 5.69 -0.09 6.21 498.48 0.94
13 97 27697.50 285.54 4.57 5.65 -0.10 6.24 512.14 0.93
14 112 30988.80 276.69 4.72 5.62 -0.11 6.26 524.41 0.92
15 124 34267.90 276.35 4.82 5.62 -0.12 6.28 532.87 0.92
16 134 37229.50 277.83 4.90 5.63 -0.12 6.29 538.15 0.92
17 145 40316.40 278.04 4.98 5.63 -0.13 6.29 541.51 0.92
18 157 43347.60 276.10 5.06 5.62 -0.13 6.30 544.01 0.91
19 171 46030.80 269.19 5.14 5.60 -0.13 6.30 547.18 0.91
20 180 47167.40 262.04 5.19 5.57 -0.13 6.31 551.19 0.91
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 1 98.00 98.00 0.00 4.58 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 10 287.40 28.74 2.30 3.36 -0.53 4.58 98.00 0.69
3 29 605.60 20.88 3.37 3.04 -0.47 4.55 94.71 0.72
4 59 1004.50 17.03 4.08 2.83 -0.44 4.52 91.47 0.74
5 102 1473.20 14.44 4.62 2.67 -0.41 4.49 88.77 0.75
6 148 1911.50 12.92 5.00 2.56 -0.40 4.46 86.73 0.76
7 198 2414.50 12.19 5.29 2.50 -0.39 4.44 84.72 0.77
8 248 2864.20 11.55 5.51 2.45 -0.38 4.42 83.03 0.77
9 297 3319.10 11.18 5.69 2.41 -0.37 4.40 81.48 0.77
10 329 3687.90 11.21 5.80 2.42 -0.36 4.38 80.00 0.78
11 360 4034.50 11.21 5.89 2.42 -0.35 4.36 78.62 0.78
12 386 4346.00 11.26 5.96 2.42 -0.35 4.35 77.34 0.79
13 405 4581.60 11.31 6.00 2.43 -0.34 4.33 76.20 0.79
14 406 4596.30 11.32 6.01 2.43 -0.34 4.32 75.31 0.79
C-17 (Globemaster III) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1996 Dollars In Millions
KC-135R (Stratotanker) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1981 Dollars In Millions
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Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 12 471.30 39.28 2.48 3.67 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 33 951.90 28.85 3.50 3.36 -0.31 4.43 83.82 0.81
3 60 1398.60 23.31 4.09 3.15 -0.32 4.48 87.86 0.80
4 92 1773.40 19.28 4.52 2.96 -0.34 4.54 93.94 0.79
5 138 2243.10 16.25 4.93 2.79 -0.36 4.59 98.80 0.78
6 180 2604.90 14.47 5.19 2.67 -0.37 4.63 102.34 0.77
7 204 2905.60 14.24 5.32 2.66 -0.37 4.63 102.30 0.77
8 228 3186.40 13.98 5.43 2.64 -0.37 4.62 101.20 0.77
9 252 3438.40 13.64 5.53 2.61 -0.36 4.60 99.97 0.78
10 273 3679.80 13.48 5.61 2.60 -0.36 4.59 98.51 0.78
11 279 3813.00 13.67 5.63 2.61 -0.36 4.57 96.85 0.78
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 4 141.00 35.25 1.39 3.56 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 8 265.30 33.16 2.08 3.50 -0.09 3.68 39.83 0.94
3 16 505.70 31.61 2.77 3.45 -0.08 3.67 39.23 0.95
4 28 842.40 30.09 3.33 3.40 -0.08 3.67 39.33 0.95
5 40 1141.90 28.55 3.69 3.35 -0.09 3.69 39.91 0.94
6 51 1464.10 28.71 3.93 3.36 -0.08 3.68 39.64 0.94
7 62 1741.00 28.08 4.13 3.34 -0.08 3.68 39.59 0.94
8 74 1991.60 26.91 4.30 3.29 -0.09 3.69 39.94 0.94
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 7 731.70 104.53 1.95 4.65 0.00 4.65 104.53 1.00
2 19 1632.10 85.90 2.94 4.45 -0.20 5.03 153.23 0.87
3 43 3016.60 70.15 3.76 4.25 -0.22 5.08 161.13 0.86
4 55 4268.00 77.60 4.01 4.35 -0.17 4.97 143.84 0.89
AV-8B (Harrier) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1979 Dollars In Millions
AV-8B (Harrier Remanufacture) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1994 Dollars In Millions
F14-D (Tomcat) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1989 Dollars In Millions
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Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 105 1071.70 10.21 4.65 2.32 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 250 1924.50 7.70 5.52 2.04 -0.33 3.84 46.36 0.80
3 425 2796.50 6.58 6.05 1.88 -0.32 3.79 44.13 0.80
4 605 3732.60 6.17 6.41 1.82 -0.29 3.68 39.50 0.82
5 725 4754.30 6.56 6.59 1.88 -0.25 3.46 31.85 0.84
6 845 5651.00 6.69 6.74 1.90 -0.22 3.29 26.77 0.86
7 989 6626.60 6.70 6.90 1.90 -0.19 3.15 23.30 0.87
8 1139 7695.50 6.76 7.04 1.91 -0.17 3.03 20.66 0.89
9 1319 8826.10 6.69 7.18 1.90 -0.15 2.93 18.80 0.90
10 1499 9914.80 6.61 7.31 1.89 -0.14 2.86 17.50 0.91
11 1679 10879.60 6.48 7.43 1.87 -0.13 2.81 16.69 0.91
12 1859 11983.30 6.45 7.53 1.86 -0.13 2.77 16.03 0.92
13 2009 13033.00 6.49 7.61 1.87 -0.12 2.74 15.41 0.92
14 2117 13696.00 6.47 7.66 1.87 -0.12 2.70 14.93 0.92
15 2165 14070.30 6.50 7.68 1.87 -0.11 2.68 14.53 0.93
16 2189 14286.30 6.53 7.69 1.88 -0.11 2.65 14.20 0.93
17 2201 14568.50 6.62 7.70 1.89 -0.10 2.63 13.86 0.93
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 2 711.10 355.55 0.69 5.87 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 12 2924.80 243.73 2.48 5.50 -0.21 6.02 411.47 0.86
3 25 5273.50 210.94 3.22 5.35 -0.21 6.02 410.00 0.87
4 48 8795.80 183.25 3.87 5.21 -0.21 6.02 410.30 0.87
5 75 12252.90 163.37 4.32 5.10 -0.21 6.02 413.18 0.86
6 107 15735.30 147.06 4.67 4.99 -0.22 6.04 418.04 0.86
7 147 19126.90 130.11 4.99 4.87 -0.23 6.06 426.59 0.85
8 203 23205.60 114.31 5.31 4.74 -0.24 6.08 438.12 0.85
9 259 26919.90 103.94 5.56 4.64 -0.25 6.11 449.54 0.84
10 315 30217.70 95.93 5.75 4.56 -0.26 6.13 460.47 0.84
11 333 31277.70 93.93 5.81 4.54 -0.26 6.15 468.41 0.83
F-22 (Raptor) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1990 Dollars In Millions
F-16 (Fighting Falcon) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1975 Dollars In Millions
 
   
 96
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 12 2378.70 198.23 2.48 5.29 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 32 4555.80 142.37 3.47 4.96 -0.34 6.13 458.49 #NUM!
3 62 7412.20 119.55 4.13 4.78 -0.31 6.05 425.16 0.81
4 98 10236.50 104.45 4.58 4.65 -0.30 6.03 416.62 0.81
5 137 13081.90 95.49 4.92 4.56 -0.30 6.02 409.81 0.81
6 185 16166.50 87.39 5.22 4.47 -0.30 6.01 406.58 0.81
7 229 19113.30 83.46 5.43 4.42 -0.29 5.99 400.92 0.82
8 271 21951.40 81.00 5.60 4.39 -0.29 5.98 393.93 0.82
9 314 24630.40 78.44 5.75 4.36 -0.28 5.96 387.85 0.82
10 364 27771.10 76.29 5.90 4.33 -0.28 5.94 381.61 0.82
11 419 31200.30 74.46 6.04 4.31 -0.27 5.93 375.14 0.83
12 461 33986.10 73.72 6.13 4.30 -0.27 5.91 368.55 0.83
13 503 36716.50 73.00 6.22 4.29 -0.27 5.89 362.20 0.83
14 548 39394.90 71.89 6.31 4.28 -0.26 5.88 356.58 0.83
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 9 368.70 40.97 2.20 3.71 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 34 971.00 28.56 3.53 3.35 -0.27 4.31 74.38 0.83
3 94 1903.60 20.25 4.54 3.01 -0.30 4.38 79.87 0.81
4 157 2931.30 18.67 5.06 2.93 -0.28 4.34 76.57 0.82
5 241 3947.10 16.38 5.48 2.80 -0.28 4.33 75.85 0.82
6 325 4849.40 14.92 5.78 2.70 -0.28 4.33 75.87 0.82
7 409 5732.90 14.02 6.01 2.64 -0.28 4.33 75.81 0.82
8 493 6500.50 13.19 6.20 2.58 -0.28 4.33 76.02 0.82
9 577 7292.40 12.64 6.36 2.54 -0.28 4.33 76.10 0.82
10 661 8105.60 12.26 6.49 2.51 -0.28 4.33 75.98 0.82
11 745 8901.60 11.95 6.61 2.48 -0.28 4.33 75.74 0.82
12 811 9517.80 11.74 6.70 2.46 -0.28 4.32 75.44 0.82
13 859 10059.00 11.71 6.76 2.46 -0.28 4.32 74.99 0.82
14 907 10676.00 11.77 6.81 2.47 -0.28 4.31 74.32 0.83
15 943 11056.20 11.72 6.85 2.46 -0.27 4.30 73.69 0.83
16 979 11519.70 11.77 6.89 2.47 -0.27 4.29 73.00 0.83
17 1003 11809.60 11.77 6.91 2.47 -0.27 4.28 72.36 0.83
18 1015 11984.40 11.81 6.92 2.47 -0.27 4.27 71.76 0.83
FA-18 E/F (Super Hornet) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 2000 Dollars In Millions
FA-18 (Hornet) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1975 Dollars In Millions
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Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 3 86.00 28.67 1.10 3.36 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 9 101.70 11.30 2.20 2.42 -0.85 4.29 72.72 0.56
3 24 164.80 6.87 3.18 1.93 -0.69 4.06 57.92 0.62
4 46 239.50 5.21 3.83 1.65 -0.62 3.94 51.42 0.65
5 68 350.10 5.15 4.22 1.64 -0.56 3.81 45.29 0.68
6 109 514.20 4.72 4.69 1.55 -0.50 3.69 40.02 0.71
7 167 728.00 4.36 5.12 1.47 -0.45 3.58 35.88 0.73
8 213 969.00 4.55 5.36 1.51 -0.41 3.48 32.44 0.75
9 248 1211.80 4.89 5.51 1.59 -0.38 3.39 29.62 0.77
10 300 1509.30 5.03 5.70 1.62 -0.35 3.30 27.24 0.78
11 353 1811.30 5.13 5.87 1.64 -0.32 3.23 25.27 0.80
12 407 2127.40 5.23 6.01 1.65 -0.30 3.16 23.63 0.81
13 481 2553.00 5.31 6.18 1.67 -0.28 3.10 22.17 0.82
14 544 2902.00 5.33 6.30 1.67 -0.26 3.04 20.95 0.83
15 592 3160.20 5.34 6.38 1.67 -0.25 2.99 19.97 0.84
16 640 3447.30 5.39 6.46 1.68 -0.24 2.95 19.15 0.85
17 688 3704.00 5.38 6.53 1.68 -0.23 2.92 18.45 0.85
18 736 3961.40 5.38 6.60 1.68 -0.22 2.88 17.86 0.86
19 782 4244.70 5.43 6.66 1.69 -0.21 2.85 17.33 0.87
Lot 
Number
Cum 
Units 
Produced
Cum 
PROC 
Cost CAUC
Ln Cum 
Units 
Produced
Ln    
(CUAC) Slope (b)
y-intercept 
(lna) T1 LCS
1 12 560.10 46.68 2.48 3.84 #NUM! #NUM! #NUM! #NUM!
2 36 978.70 27.19 3.58 3.30 -0.49 5.07 158.50 0.71
3 48 1642.60 34.22 3.87 3.53 -0.30 4.55 94.42 0.81
4 60 1924.30 32.07 4.09 3.47 -0.24 4.39 80.88 0.84
5 72 2240.50 31.12 4.28 3.44 -0.22 4.31 74.52 0.86
6 84 2497.70 29.73 4.43 3.39 -0.21 4.28 72.03 0.87
7 96 2804.30 29.21 4.56 3.37 -0.20 4.25 70.09 0.87
8 108 3088.60 28.60 4.68 3.35 -0.19 4.23 68.79 0.88
9 123 3366.40 27.37 4.81 3.31 -0.19 4.23 68.68 0.88
10 138 3655.40 26.49 4.93 3.28 -0.19 4.23 69.02 0.87
11 153 3964.20 25.91 5.03 3.25 -0.19 4.24 69.34 0.87
12 167 4242.60 25.40 5.12 3.23 -0.20 4.24 69.66 0.87
13 173 4412.30 25.50 5.15 3.24 -0.20 4.24 69.58 0.87
14 181 4615.70 25.50 5.20 3.24 -0.19 4.24 69.28 0.87
T-45-TS (Goshawk) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 1995 Dollars In Millions
T6-A (JPATS) Learning Curve Calculations In BY 2002 Dollars In Millions
 
   
 98
 
Bibliography 
 
10 U.S.C., 2430  Major Defense Acquisition Program Defined  22 January 2002 
 http://uscode.house.gov. 
 
Air Force Material Command (AFMC). AFMC Financial Management Handbook. 
 Wright Patterson AFB OH: December 2001 
 http://www.deskbook.osd.mil. 
 
-----. Statutory/Policy Changes. AFMC Acquisition Reform Guide. Wright Patterson AFB 
OH: 19 February 1999. 
 
Bair, Edward T. Defense Acquisition Reform; Behind the Rhetoric of Reform – Landmark 
Commissions Lessons Learned. Executive Research Project, Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces, 1994. 
 
Cheney, Richard B.  Defense Management Report to the President, Report written by 
Secretary of Defense, 12 July 1989. 
 
Christensen, David., David Searle, and Dr. Caisse Vickery. “The Impact of the Packard 
Commission’s Recommendation on Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense 
Acquisition Contracts,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, pages 251-262 (Summer 
1999). 
 
Christensen, David., and Carl Templin. “An Analysis of Management Reserve Budget on 
Defense Acquisition Contracts,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, pages 191-208 
(Summer 2000).  http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arqtoc.asp 
 
D’Agostino, Ralph B. and Michael A. Stephens.  Goodness-of-Fit Techniques.  New 
York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1986. 
 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996., 2001.  
 http://www.dau.mil/jdam/contents/clinger_cohen.htm. 
 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD 
5000.2-R Rewrite., 2001. 
http://www.dau.mil/jdam/contents/dod%5F5000rewrite.htm. 
 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994., 2001.  http://www.dau.mil/jdam/contents/fasa.htm. 
 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). What is Acquisition Reform., 2001.  
 http://www.dau.mil/jdam/contents/whatis.html. 
   
 99
 
-----. DoD 5000.2-R Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition 
Programs.  Washington: GPO, 5 April 2002. 
 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/50002r_040502/p50002r.pdf. 
 
Department of Defense.  Program Acquisition Cost By Weapon System – Department of 
Defense Budget for Fiscal Years 2004/2005. February 2003. 
 http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/fy2004_weabook.pdf. 
 
Devore, Jay L. Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences (Fifth 
Edition). Pacific Grove, California: Duxbury, 2000. 
 
Drezner, J. A., J. M. Jarvaise, R. W. Hess, P. G. Hough, and D. Norton.  An Analysis of 
Weapon System Cost Growth.  Santa Monica CA:  RAND, 1993 (MR-291-AF). 
 
Ferrara, Joe.  “DoD’s 5000 Documents: Evolution and Change in Defense Acquisition 
Policy,” Acquisition Review Quarterly, pages 109-130 (Fall 1996). 
 http://www.dau.mil/pubs/arqtoc.asp 
 
Fox, Ronald D. and James L. Field. The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons 
Acquisition. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988. 
 
Gibbons, Jean Dickenson.  Nonparametric Statistical Inference (Second Edition). New 
York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1985. 
 
Holbrook, Mark A. An Analysis of the Implementation of Acquisition Reform Initiatives 
and Cost Growth Variance. MS Thesis, AFIT/GCA/ENV/03, School of 
Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-
Patterson AFB OH, March 2003. 
 
Hough, Paul G.  Pitfalls in Calculating Cost Growth from Selected Acquisition Reports.  
Santa Monica CA:  RAND, 1992 (N-3136-AF). 
 
Jarvaise, J. M., J. A. Drezner, and D. Norton.  The Defense System Cost Performance 
Datatabase - Cost Growth Analysis Using Selected Acquisition Reports. Santa 
Monica CA:  RAND, 1996 (MR-625). 
 
Jones, Wilbur D. Jr. Arming the Eagle: A History of U.S. Weapons Acquisition Since 
1775, Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College Press, 1999. 
 
Kaminski, Paul G., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology.  
Statement before the House Committee on National Security on Defense 
Acquisition Reform, 26 February 1997.  
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ousda/kaminski/acq_reform.html. 
   
 100
 
Leonard, S. Robert. “FA22 Adjusted Cost Growth Example.”  RAND, Santa Monica CA. 
Electronic Message.  21 Nov 2003. 
 
McClave, James T., P. George Benson, Terry Sincich. Statistics for Business and 
Economics. Uppper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
 
McCrillis, D. John.  “Derivation of Cost Variance Normalization Equation for Quantity 
Changes Using Learning Curve Theory.” Cost Analysis Improvement Group, 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.  Electronic Message. 20 
Nov 2003. 
 
McClave, James T., P. George Benson, Terry Sincich. Statistics for Business and 
Economics. Uppper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001. 
 
Munechika, Curtis K. Acquisition Reform: “This, Too, Shall Pass…?”  ACSC Thesis, 
AU/ACSC/0385/97-03, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB AL, 
March 1997.   
 
National Partnership for Reinventing Government. Savings Associated with NPR for NPR 
Recommendations Made in 1993 and 1995.  Washington: 27 Oct 1999. 
 http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/misc/savings.html. 
 
National Performance Review. Reinventing Federal Procurement.  Washington:  14 
September 1993.  
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/sysrpt93/reinven.html. 
 
Neter, John., Michael H. Kutner, Christopher J. Nachtsheim, and William Wasserman.  
Applied Linear Statistical Models (Fourth Edition).  Boston, MA: WCB McGraw-
Hill, 1996. 
 
Reeves, Stephen V. The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform: Past, Present, and Future. 
Executive Research Project, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1996. 
 
Reinvention Roundtable. Reinventing Government’s Second Phase is Underway.  
Washington: April 1995. 
 http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/misc/savings.html. 
 
Society of Cost Estimators (SCEA). Module 7: “Learning Curve Analysis – How to 
Account for Cost Improvement,” Cost Program Review of Fundamentals, 2002. 
 
Searle, David A. The Impact of the Packard Commission’s Recommendations on 
Reducing Cost Overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. MS Thesis, 
AFIT/GCM/LAS/97S-12, School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, September 1997. 
   
 101
 
Sheskin, David J.  Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures 
(Second Edition).  New York: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2000. 
 
US Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. Defense for Peace: Report to the President and the 
Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense. Washington, D.C., 
Department of Defense. 1970. 
 
Wandland, Klaes W. & Gary P. Wickman. Analysis of Cost and Schedule Growth on Sole 
Source and Competetive Air Force Contracts. MS Thesis, AFIT/GSM/LAS/93S-
20, School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, September 1993. 
 
Wolfowitz, Paul, Cancellation of DoD 5000 Defense Acquisition Policy Documents. 
Memorandum for Director, Washington Headquarters Service, 30 October 2002. 
 
   
 102
Vita 
Captain Richard A. Phillips was born in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  He 
graduated high school from Richmond Academy High School in 1992 and entered the 
University Of Maryland at College Park in 1994.  He graduated with university and 
departmental honors in 1998 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Accounting.  In July of 
1999, he attended Officer Training School at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and graduated as a 
Second Lieutenant 30 September 1999.  After OTS, he was assigned to Air Mobility 
Command, where he served as a Budget Analyst for the 375th Comptroller Squadron at 
Scott Air Force Base in Illinois.  During this assignment, his unit earned back to back 
Best Budget Office in Air Mobility Command awards for 2000 and 2001.  In August 
2002, he entered the Cost Analysis Master’s Program at the Air Force Institute of 
Technology’s School of Engineering and Management.  Upon graduation, he will be 
assigned as a Cost Analyst in the Electronic Systems Center, Hanscom Air Force Base in 
Massachusetts. 
 
  
 
 
 
   
 103
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
23-03-2004 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
     
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Sep 2002 – Mar 2004 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEMS COST GROWTH AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES USING A HYBRID 
ADJUSTED COST GROWTH MODEL  
 5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Phillips, Richard A., Captain, USAF 
 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 641
 WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GCA/ENV/04M-08 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
OSD/PA&E 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
  Office of the Secretary of Defense – Program Analysis & Evaluation 
  1800 Defense Pentagon 
  Washington, DC 20301-1800 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
       
        APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
14. ABSTRACT  
This thesis examined cost growth in DoD aircraft weapon systems from 1991 to 2001 using Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) data with a 
hybrid adjusted cost growth (ACG) model.  In addition, an analysis of acquisition reform initiatives was conducted to determine if reform efforts 
impacted aircraft systems cost growth.  A “pre-reform” (1 January 1991 to 31 December 1996) period and “post reform” (1 January 1997 to 31 
December 2001) period was subjectively developed to compare the mean annual ACG during each period.  This research effort analyzed 78 
SARs for 13 aircraft systems that reported a Milestone II baseline.  Results revealed an annual ACG average of 40 percent from 1 January 1991 
to 31 December 2001.  The acquisition reform analysis included 43 SARs from 11 programs during the pre-reform period and 35 SARs from 7 
programs in the post-reform period.  Statistical tests revealed that at a .05 significance level no significant statistical difference existed between 
the reform periods. 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Acquisition Reform; Cost Growth; Cost Analysis; Defense Procurement 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE 
PERSON 
Michael A. Greiner, Major, USAF 
a. REPORT 
 
U 
b. ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. 
THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
17. LIMITATION 
OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
 
114 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include 
area code) 
(937) 255-3636, ext 4588;  
e-mail:  Michael.greiner@afit.edu 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
 
